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VICTIMS OF CLIMATE CHANGE AND THEIR STANDING TO SUE:
WHY THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA GOT IT RIGHT
Joseph M Stancati*
"June isn't really June anymore.
- Canadian Inuit James Qillaq, suggesting to his fellow villagers that
the Inuit word for June, qiqsuqqaqtuq, should be changed because
it refers to snow conditions that no longer occur in June.'
INTRODUCTION
The United States government is preparing to relocate several Inuit
villages along the Alaskan coast, where thawing permafrost is destabilizing
the foundations of homes. Each of these relocations will cost at least one
hundred million dollars.2 A few hundred miles away, Canadian Arctic Inu-
vialuit3 hunters risk falling into water as they navigate snow-covered areas
where the ice underneath is rapidly receding or thinning.4 Polar bears, a
traditional food source for the Inuit, are themselves threatened by the retreat
of sea ice, on which they depend to capture seals.5 The bears could be ex-
tinct by the end of this century.6 The Arctic Climate Impact Assessment
found that the Arctic's climate in particular is warming at a rate that far
exceeds the global average rate of warming.7 By the end of this century, the
. BA, Miami University of Ohio (2004); JD, Case Western Reserve University School of
Law (2007). I particularly thank Alexander McClean and Eric Landen for their advice on this
Note. I also thank my dad for his suggestions, and Professor Jonathan Adler for informing
me of the case that is the subject of this Note.
1 Steven Lee Myers et al., Old Ways of Life Are Fading as the Arctic Thaws, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 20, 2005, at Al.
2 id.
3 The "Inuvialuit" are Inuit people who live in the western Canadian Arctic region.
4 See Myers et al., supra note 1.
5 Id.
6 Juliet Eilperin, Study Says Polar Bears Could Face Extinction, WASH. POST, Nov. 9,
2004, at A13.
7 See id. ("The [Arctic Climate Impact Assessment] concluded that some areas in the
Arctic have warmed 10 times as fast as the world as a whole, which has warmed an average
of 1 degree Fahrenheit over the past century."). The Arctic Climate Impact Assessment re-
sulted from four years of work by more than three hundred scientists. Id. See also
INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, Summary for Policymakers, in IPCC,
CLIMATE CHANGE 2001: SYNTHESIS REPORT, at 1, 9 (Robert T. Watson et al. eds., 2001)
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summertime Arctic Ocean may be ice-free, which has not occurred on Earth
for at least a million years. 8 This trend of decreasing ice is likely irreversi-
ble.9 One of the many consequences of this Arctic melting is coastal flood-
ing. 10 The deglaciation of Greenland alone would elevate the sea level by up
to six meters.' 1 People living in the Arctic are distraught, knowing that their
cultures and traditions are dying because of climate change. 12 Though their
lifestyle produces virtually zero greenhouse gas emissions, they "are experi-
encing a disproportionate impact of the consequences" of global climate
change.
13
Arthur and Anne Berndt, a married couple who own a 530-acre ma-
ple sugar farm in Vermont (Maverick Farm), are similarly distraught by
changes beyond their control. The farm they have owned for nearly twenty
years comprises about 16,000 sugar maple trees, making it one of Ver-
mont's largest maple syrup producers. 4 In recent years the farm has deterio-
rated: seed production is "unusually and exceedingly heavy," a sign that the
trees are stressed; the regeneration rate of the trees has dropped, as new
trees die when they are still saplings; dieback 15 is more prevalent in the
[hereinafter IPCC Summary for Policymakers], available at http://www.ipcc.ch/pub/un/syre
ng/spm.pdf ("Nearly all land areas will very likely warm more than . . . global averages,
particularly those at northern high latitudes in winter.").
8 Jonathan T. Overpeck et al., Arctic System on Trajectory to New, Seasonally Ice-Free
State, 86 Eos 309, 309 (2005).
9 See id. at 312 ("The processes and interactions among primary components of the Arctic
system, as presently understood, cannot reverse the observed trends toward significant reduc-
tions in ice.").
10 Other consequences include: (1) the likely decrease of albedo ("albedo" refers to the
capacity of ice to reflect light, which makes the Earth's temperature cooler than it would be
otherwise) and (2) the possible release of large volumes of greenhouse gases previously
contained in the permafrost. Id. Both consequences would accelerate the pace of global
warming.
11 Id. The study's authors state that such a complete deglaciation of Greenland "would
take many centuries at present rates," but also note that "destabilizing mechanisms such as
basal sliding" could expedite the deglaciation. Id. at 309.
12 See Myers et al., supra note 1. Myers' article quotes an Inuvialuit, Hank Rogers, who
lamented, "(tihe next generation coming up is not going to experience what we did. We can't
pass the traditions on as our ancestors passed on to us." Id. Another Inuvialuit, Danny A.
Gordon, said, "In the summer 40 years ago, we had lots of icebergs, and you could land your
boat on them and climb on them even in summer. Now in the winter they are tiny. The
weather has changed. Everyone knows it... is global warming." Id.
13 Overpeck et al., supra note 8, at 312.
14 Declaration of Arthur Berndt at 1-2, Friends of the Earth v. Watson, No. C 02-4106
(N.D. Cal. Feb. 11, 2005) [hereinafter Berndt Declaration], available at http://climatelawsuit.
org/documents/DeclrBerndtFinal.pdf.
15 "Dieback" is a plant disease caused by fungi that infect the roots of the tree and may
eventually kill the tree. Symptoms of dieback are visible in the crown of the tree. See DEP'T
OF CROP SCIENCES, UNIV. OF ILL. EXTENSION, REPORT ON PLANT DISEASE: DECLINE AND
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crown of trees, resulting in diminished maple syrup production; tempera-
tures below freezing, necessary for the trees to produce maple syrup, are
less frequent and warmer. 6 The Berndts believe that climate change is the
principal cause of this deterioration. Worse, they fear that their sugar maple
trees soon may disappear from the farm altogether. 17 The 2002 U.S. Climate
Action Report predicts "a significant northward shift in prevailing forest
types," culminating in the virtual absence of sugar maple trees in Vermont
by the last third of this century.' 8 The report acknowledges that this shift
will occur more rapidly than predicted if climate change also begets in-
creased pest outbreaks, droughts, and other natural occurrences that deci-
mate tree populations.' 9 Facing the imminent and progressive loss of value
of their farm, the Berndts are considering selling the trees as timber, but
admit that they "are in denial because it is too depressing to consider the
loss of Maverick Farm's long-term value. 2°
The Berndts are members of Friends of the Earth and Greenpeace,
two of the Plaintiffs21 in Friends of the Earth v. Watson,22 a climate change
lawsuit against two U.S. government agencies pending before the U.S. Dis-
trict Court for the Northern District of California. In August of 2005, the
judge23 ruled in favor of the Plaintiffs and granted them standing to sue the
DIEBACK OF TREES AND SHRUBS 1-2 (1996), available at http://web.aces.uiuc.edu/vista/pdf_
pubs/641 .pdf.
16 Berndt Declaration, supra note 14, at 2-3.
17 id.
18 U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, U.S. CLIMATE ACTION REPORT 2002, at 97 fig.6-8 (2002), avail-
able at http://yosemite.epa.gov/oar/globalwarming.nsf/UniqueKeyLookup/SHSU5BWHU6/
$File/uscar.pdf.
19 See id. at 98 ("The effects of climate change on the rate and magnitude of disturbance
(forest damage and destruction associated with fires, storms, droughts, and pest outbreaks)
will be important factors in determining whether transitions from one forest type to another
will be gradual or abrupt. If the rate and type of disturbances in New England do not in-
crease, for example, a smooth transition from the present maple, beech, and birch tree species
to oak and hickory may occur. Where the frequency or intensity of disturbances increases,
however, transitions are very likely to occur more rapidly.").
20 Berndt Declaration, supra note 14, at 3.
21 Friends of the Earth and Greenpeace are suing on behalf of their members, including the
Berndts and other members whose injuries are discussed infra Part III.B.
22 Friends of the Earth v. Watson, No. C 02-4106 (N.D. Cal. filed Aug. 27, 2002). The
official name of the case is now Friends of the Earth v. Mosbacher, reflecting the fact that
Robert Mosbacher, Jr., is the new President and CEO of the Overseas Private Investment
Corporation. See Defendant Ex-Im Bank's Cross Motion for Summary Judgment, Friends of
the Earth v. Watson, No. C 02-4106 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 31, 2006), available at http://climatela
wsuit.org/2006/Cross%20motionshow case-doc.pdf. This Note calls the case "Friends of the
Earth v. Watson."
23 Judge Jeffrey S. White was nominated to the federal bench by President George W.
Bush in 2002. Jeffrey White Nominated for U.S. District Court Bench, http://www.law.ber
keley.edu/news/2002/white.html (last visited Feb. 18, 2007).
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Defendants 24-the Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) and the
Export-Import Bank of the United States (Ex-Im)--for the agencies' failure
to prepare environmental impact statements regarding the effects of their
overseas energy projects on global climate change.25 Never before had a
plaintiff established Article III standing26 in a lawsuit involving injuries
caused by climate change.27
Before initiating this lawsuit, the Plaintiffs tried to induce the De-
fendants to prepare the environmental impact statements voluntarily. The
Plaintiffs sent demand letters to OPIC and Ex-Im requesting that each
agency prepare an environmental impact statement (EIS) to analyze the
effect of its projects on global climate change.28 Since Friends of the Earth
and Greenpeace actively campaign to mitigate climate change, the EIS
would provide useful information to the organizations about the impact of
government action on the environment. OPIC and Ex-Im refused to prepare
an EIS, claiming that an EIS was unnecessary because their projects did not
significantly affect the environment. The Plaintiffs then brought this lawsuit
under the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA),2 9 which
requires all federal agencies to prepare an EIS for any action "significantly
affecting the quality of the human environment." The requirements of Arti-
cle III standing traditionally have been an insurmountable obstacle for cli-
mate change plaintiffs, preventing them from exercising their right to sue
the government under NEPA. Consequently, the Watson ruling, holding that
the Plaintiffs have established all elements of Article III standing, is signifi-
cant.
24 All uses of the capitalized "Plaintiffs" and "Defendants" in this Note refer to the Watson
parties.
25 Friends of the Earth v. Watson, No. C 02-4106 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 23, 2005) (order deny-
ing Defendants' motion for summary judgment) [hereinafter Order Denying MSJ], available
at http://climatelawsuit.org/documents/ruling82305.pdf.
26 "Article III standing" means the requisite standing for any federal plaintiff under Article
III of the Constitution, which gives federal courts jurisdiction to hear "Cases" and "Contro-
versies." U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
27 See U.S. Judge OKs Suit on Global Warming-Agencies' Financing of Overseas Energy
Projects Challenged, S.F. CHRON., Aug. 25, 2005, at BI, available at http://www.sfgate.
com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?f=/c/a/2005/08/25/BAGCVECHVJ1.DTL. The Defendants filed a
motion for summary judgment in February of 2005, alleging, inter alia, that the Plaintiffs
lacked standing to sue under Article III of the U.S. Constitution ("Article III standing").
Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, No. C 02-4106 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 11, 2005) [here-
inafter MSJ], available at http://climatelawsuit.org/documents/DefSJMotionFinal.pdf.
That motion was denied. Order Denying MSJ, supra note 25.
28 Plaintiffs' Opposition to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment at 1-2, No. C 02-
4106 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 29, 2005) [hereinafter Opposition to MSJ], available at http://climatela
wsuit.org/documents/POpp to_D_SJMotion.final.pdf.
29 National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321, 4331-4335,
4341-4347 (2006).
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Part I of this Note outlines the scientific basis of global climate
change, its present and future consequences, and the implications of the
U.S. government's reticence to address those consequences through manda-
tory reductions of greenhouse gas emissions. Part I endeavors to demon-
strate why some scientists and world leaders believe global climate change
is the most urgent threat facing humanity. Part II explains the purpose and
provisions of the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), which pro-
vides the statutory basis for Watson. Part II then examines the requirements
for Article III standing under NEPA, and the reasons that previous climate
change litigants have been unable to meet those requirements. Part II con-
cludes by summarizing the Supreme Court's "constrained" articulation of
Article III standing in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife. Part III introduces the
Watson lawsuit by describing the Plaintiffs and their alleged injuries, and
their theory of OPIC and Ex-Im contributions to those injuries. The purpose
of this description is to distinguish Watson from the failed climate change
lawsuits examined in Part II. Part IV analyzes the district court ruling that
granted the Watson Plaintiffs standing. The analysis explains why the Wat-
son ruling was correct under both Ninth Circuit precedent and Lujan, which
is the thesis of this Note. Because the Watson ruling was correct, Part V
predicts that the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals would uphold the Plaintiffs'
standing on appeal. Part V also explores the implications of the Watson rul-
ing for future climate change litigation.
I. A DIFFERENT WORLD: CLIMATE CHANGE'S THREAT TO
U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY
The global average surface temperature, which has risen by an es-
timated 0.6'C (I°F) since the late nineteenth century,3° is projected to rise
by between 2°C and 4.5'C (3.5°F and 8°F) above the 1990 level by the end
of this century.31 The Third Assessment Report (TAR) of the Intergovern-
mental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) contains reliable evidence that
human activity is causing most of the warming.32 Emissions of carbon diox-
ide and other greenhouse gases33 drive this temperature increase. 34 The at-
30 C.K. FOLLAND ET AL., Observed Climate Variability and Change, in IPCC, CLIMATE
CHANGE 2001: THE SCIENTIFIC BASIS, at 101, 101 (J.T. Houghton et al. eds., 2001), available
at http://www.grida.no/climate/ipcc-tar/wgl /pdf/TAR-02.PDF.
31 U. CUBASCH ET AL., Projections of Future Climate Change, in 1PCC, CLIMATE CHANGE
2001: THE SCIENTIFIC BASIS, at 527, 555 (J.T. Houghton et al. eds., 2001), available at
http://www.grida.no/climate/ipcc tar/wgl/pdf/TAR-09.PDF.
32 See IPCC Summary for Policymakers, supra note 7, at 5-6; see also id. at 7 fig.SPM-
2(a) (showing that natural (i.e., non-anthropogenic) forces, acting alone, would actually have
caused a cooling of the Earth's temperature since 1950).
33 In addition to carbon dioxide (CO2), significant anthropogenic greenhouse gases in-
clude: methane (CH4), nitrous oxide (N20), and tropospheric ozone (03). See id at 4.
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mospheric concentration of carbon dioxide has increased by 31% since
1750, 35 mostly due to human activities such as fossil fuel combustion.
36
Consistent with this increasing concentration, the 1990s were likely the
warmest decade of the millennium. 37 Temperatures across the United States
will increase by between 3C and 5'C (5.5'F and 9°F) over this century.38
In the southeastern and south-central United States, the average summer
heat index is projected to increase by 120C (21.50F).39 Heat waves will
grow "more frequent, more intense and longer-lasting.,
40
In conjunction with the IPCC's Fourth Assessment Report (due in
late 2007), fifteen scientific institutes worldwide are running "extended
climate simulations." Using "various assumptions about energy use, eco-
nomic development and population increase," these simulations project the
global temperature increase over the twenty-first century.41 Even using "the
most optimistic assumptions" (i.e., assuming a dramatic worldwide shift
toward renewable energy), the simulation at the Max Planck Institute for
Meteorology in Hamburg, Germany, shows an ice-free summertime Arctic
Ocean by 2090, corroborating the prediction of the Arctic Climate Impact
Assessment.42 The optimistic simulation also predicted increased extreme
precipitation and extreme drought worldwide, and a forty-centimeter sea
level rise by the end of the century (due to oceanic thermal expansion and
some deglaciation of Greenland).43 Although the negative consequences of
34 See id. ("The radiative forcing from anthropogenic greenhouse gases is positive with a
small uncertainty range."). Emissions of carbon dioxide account for approximately 70% of
the total anthropogenic contribution to global warming. See Pew Center on Global Climate
Change, World Anthropogenic Emissions of GHGs, http://www.pewclimate.org/global-
warming-basics/factsandfigures/athroghgs.cfin (last visited Feb. 18, 2007).
35 IPCC Summary for Policymakers, supra note 7, at 5 tbl.SPM- 1.
36 Id. at4.
37 FOLLAND ET AL., supra note 30. All IPCC reports discussed in this Note use the follow-
ing terms to express confidence levels about particular conclusions: "virtually certain
(greater than 99% chance that a result is true); very likely (90-99% chance); likely (66-90%
chance); medium likelihood (33-66% chance); unlikely (10-33% chance); very unlikely (1-
10% chance); exceptionally unlikely (less than 1% chance)." E.g., IPCC Summary for Poli-
cymakers, supra note 7, at 5.
38 Michael C. MacCracken et al., Climate Change Scenarios for the U.S. National Assess-
ment, 84 BULL. AM. METEOROLOGICAL SOC'Y 1711, 1715 (2003), available at http://ams.all
enpress.com/perlserv/?request=get-pdf&doi= 10.11 75%2FBAMS-84-12-1711.
39 Declaration of Dr. Michael C. MacCracken at 28, Friends of the Earth v. Watson, No. C
02-4106 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 11, 2005) [hereinafter MacCracken Declaration], available at
http://climatelawsuit.org/documents/DeclrMacCracken.pdf.
40 Id. (citing Gerald A. Meehl & Claudia Tebaldi, More Intense, More Frequent, and
Longer Lasting Heat Waves in the 21st Century, 305 SCIENCE 994 (2004)).
41 Quirin Schiermeier, The Costs of Global Warming, 439 NATURE 374, 374-75 (2006).
42 See id. at 375.
43 id.
[Vol. 38:687
VICTIMS OF CLIMATE CHANGE
global climate change will affect all regions of the planet, people who are
already vulnerable to hunger and disease will be the first to experience those
consequences acutely." Rising temperatures are projected to increase the
spread of infectious diseases, especially in poor tropical and subtropical
countries. 45 Cereal crop yields are projected to decrease in these same coun-
tries, particularly where temperature increase coincides with decreased rain-
fall.
46
As the Earth warms, many species are likely to disappear because
climate change promotes infectious diseases.47 Global warming was a "key
factor" in encouraging outbreaks of a pathogenic fungus that has swiftly
obliterated several dozen species of frogs in Central and South America,
according to a Nature magazine study.48 Since climate change is promoting
infectious diseases and decreasing biodiversity, "the urgency of reducing
greenhouse-gas concentrations is now undeniable. ' 49 Zoologist Andrew R.
Blaustein and biologist Andy Dobson commented on the study, "[t]he pow-
erful synergy between pathogen transmission and climate change should
give us cause for concern about human health in a warmer world." 50
According to Britain's leading scientist, Royal Society President
Robert May, the consequences of global climate change are as serious of a
threat to humanity as weapons of mass destruction.5' Indeed, a 2003 U.S.
report prepared for the Pentagon states that "climate change and its follow-
on effects pose a severe risk to political, economic, and social stability"
worldwide.52 Global decreases in food production, access to fresh water,
44 See IPCC Summary for Policymakers, supra note 7, at 12 ("The impacts of climate
change will fall disproportionately upon developing countries and the poor persons within all
countries, and thereby exacerbate inequities in health status and access to adequate food,
clean water, and other resources.").
45 See id. at 9 (noting-with medium to high confidence-that climate changed will in-
crease "ranges of disease vectors" such as malaria-carrying mosquitoes).
46 Id. at 12.
47 See J. Alan Pounds et al., Widespread Amphibian Extinctions from Epidemic Disease
Driven by Global Warming, 439 NATURE 161, 161 (2006).
48 Id.
49 Id.
50 Andrew R. Blaustein & Andy Dobson, Extinctions: A Message from the Frogs, 439
NATURE 143, 144 (2006).
51 See Hard-Core Evidence: As Climate Experts Meet in Montreal, the Case for Man-
Made Global Warming Continues to Build, HOUSTON CHRON., Nov. 29, 2005, at B8 ("The
consequences 'are rising to levels which invite comparison with weapons of mass destruc-
tion."') (quoting May). Among the consequences mentioned by May were a rising sea level,
diminishing freshwater supplies in some areas, and increasingly frequent extreme weather
events such as droughts, floods and hurricanes. Id.
52 PETER SCHWARTZ & DOUG RANDALL, AN ABRUPT CLIMATE CHANGE SCENARIO AND ITS
IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. NAT'L SECURITY 5 (2003), http://oco.jpl.nasa.gov/pubs/AbruptClim
ateChangeScenario.pdf.
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and energy supplies are among the resource constraints that could lead to
such instability.5 3 The report elucidates a "plausible" scenario in which
global warming "lead[s] to harsher winter weather conditions, sharply re-
duced soil moisture, and more intense winds in certain regions that currently
provide a significant fraction of the world's food production. 5 4 Ominously,
the report raises the possibility of "a significant drop in the human carrying
capacity of the Earth's environment., 55 Nations may fight wars as a means
of acquiring the resources necessary for their survival. 6 An October 2006
review by former World Bank chief economist Nicholas Stem warns that
climate change is set to have gigantic consequences for the global economy.
The study predicts that climate change will reduce the current global gross
domestic product by 5% to 20% by the year 2100 if greenhouse gas emis-
sions continue at their present pace. 7 It also estimates that the cost of stabi-
lizing greenhouse gas concentrations at relatively benign levels would be
only one percent of the global gross domestic product.58
The United States has not ratified the Kyoto Protocol to the United
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (Kyoto Protocol), 59 an
agreement that now includes 157 countries committed to reducing their
greenhouse gas emissions.60 The objective of the Kyoto Protocol is a 5%
reduction in global greenhouse gas emissions from 1990 levels for the pe-
riod of 2008-2012.61 The Kyoto Protocol became legally binding on Febru-
ary 16, 2005, after Russia ratified it in December of 2004.62 Despite wide-
spread support for its ratification among the American public, 63 President
" See id at 2.
54 Id. at 1.
55 Id.
56 Id. at 2 ("Unlikely alliances could be formed as defense priorities shift and the goal is
resources for survival rather than religion, ideology, or national honor.").
57 Jim Giles, How Much Will it Cost to Save the World?, 444 NATURE 6, 6 (2006).
58 See id
59 Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Dec.
10, 1997, 37 I.L.M. 32 [hereinafter Kyoto Protocol].
60 U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change [UNFCCC], Kyoto Protocol Status of
Ratification (Dec. 13, 2006), http://unfccc.int/files/essentialbackground/kyotoprotocol/ap
plication/pdf/kpstats.pdf.
61 Kyoto Protocol, supra note 59, art. 3.
62 Kyoto Protocol Comes into Force, BBC NEWS, Feb. 16, 2005, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/
hi/science/nature/4267245.stm ("Russia's entry was vital, because the protocol had to be
ratified by nations accounting for at least 55% of greenhouse gas emissions to become
valid.").
63 A 2005 poll found that 73% of Americans think the United States should participate in
the Kyoto Protocol. THE PIPAKNOWLEDGE NETWORKS POLL, AMERICANS ON CLIMATE
CHANGE: 2005, at 4 (2005), http://65.109.167.118/pipa/pdf/jul05/ClimateChange05Jul05r
pt.pdf.
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Bush has rejected the Kyoto Protocol64 because it does not require develop-
ing countries like China to limit emissions, which he perceives as unfair to
the U.S. Additionally, he believes that acceding to the Kyoto Protocol
would lead to higher energy prices and harm the U.S. economy.65 Australia
is the only other industrialized nation that has not ratified the Kyoto Proto-
col.6 6 The Bush administration instead has promoted a plan that relies on
technological advances to control greenhouse gas emissions without setting
mandatory reduction targets.67 At the December 2005 United Nations Cli-
mate Change Conference in Montreal, Canada, the American delegation
announced that the United States would not consider any measures to man-
date a reduction of its greenhouse gas emissions. 68 Responding to this an-
nouncement at a news conference, Canadian Prime Minister Paul Martin
said, "[to] the reticent nations, including the United States, I say this: There
is such a thing as a global conscience, and now is the time to listen to it."
69
Following Hurricane Katrina, a debate surfaced in the American
media about whether and to what extent climate change affects hurricanes.
While the scientific community has not reached a consensus on this issue,
support is increasing for the theory that climate change and hurricane inten-
sity are positively correlated. For example, Massachusetts Institute of Tech-
nology Professor Kerry Emanuel, a meteorologist and hurricane expert long
known for his skepticism of any link between climate change and hurri-
canes, recently published an article in Nature magazine endorsing the con-
nection between rising ocean surface temperatures and hurricane intensity.
7°
Emanuel's article has significantly impacted scientific debate on the issue. 71
The article predicts that future warming of the oceans will lead to increas-
64 A majority of Americans are unaware of this fact. See id. ("Only 43% are aware that
[President Bush] opposes US participation [in the Kyoto Protocol].").
65 Paul Reynolds, Kyoto: Why Did the US Pull Out?, BBC NEWS, Mar. 30, 2001,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/l/hi/world/americas/1248757.stm.
66 Bush Administration Unveils Alternative Climate Pact, N.Y. TIMES, July 28, 2005, at
A2.
67 Id.
68 Andrew C. Revkin, US. Resists New Targets for Curbing Emissions, N.Y. TIMES, Dec.
8, 2005, at A3. Although the United States has not ratified the Kyoto Protocol, it is a party to
the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, a treaty whose parties pledge
to cut greenhouse gas emissions. United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change,
May 9, 1992, 1771 U.N.T.S. 107.
69 Revkin, supra note 68.
70 Claudia Dreifus, With Findings on Storms, Centrist Recasts Warming Debate, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 10, 2006, at F2.
71 Id. Stanford climatologist Stephen Schneider noted, "[Emanuel's] paper has had a fan-
tastic impact on the policy debate. Emanuel's this conservative, apolitical guy, and he's say-
ing, 'Global warming is real."' Id.
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ingly destructive hurricanes and a corresponding greater loss of human life
and property.72
Uncertainty exists in the science of climate change. The arguments
against reducing greenhouse gas emissions typically emphasize this point.
However, as the science advances, the uncertainty shifts from whether we
are affecting the climate, to how we are doing so.
II. THE NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ACT AND CLIMATE CHANGE:
PAST FAILURES TO ACHIEVE STANDING
A. NEPA's Purposes and Provisions
To address the environmental consequences of government actions,
Congress passed the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA).73
The stated purposes of NEPA include preventing environmental degradation
and promoting human health and welfare.74 Its central feature is a require-
ment that all federal agencies prepare an environmental impact statement
(EIS) for proposals of major federal actions that significantly affect the
quality of the human environment.75 In addition to assessing the environ-
mental impact of the proposed federal action,76 the EIS must identify and
describe:
(ii) any adverse environmental effects which cannot be avoided should the
proposal be implemented, (iii) alternatives to the proposed action, (iv) the
relationship between local short-term uses of man's environment and the
maintenance and enhancement of long-term productivity, and (v) any irre-
versible and irretrievable commitments of resources which would be in-
volved in the proposed action should it be implemented. 77
An agency must prepare an EIS only if the proposed "major Federal ac-
tion[]" will significantly affect the quality of the human environment.78 If an
agency is unsure whether the action will significantly affect the quality of
the human environment, it must prepare an environmental assessment
72 Kerry Emanuel, Increasing Destructiveness of Tropical Cyclones Over the Past 30
Years, 436 NATURE 686, 686 (2005). Another recent study by ten scientific research centers
concluded that human activity is causing at least two-thirds of this increase in ocean surface
temperatures. See Press Release 06-128, National Science Foundation, Hurricane Breeding
Grounds Heat Up: Human Activities Affect Ocean Temperatures in Areas Where Hurricanes
Form (Sept. 12, 2006), http://www.nsf.gov/news/news-summ.jsp?cntn-id=107991.
7' 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321, 4331-4335, 4341-4347 (2006).
14 Id. § 4321.
71 Id. § 4332(2)(C).
76 Id. § 4332(2)(C)(i).
71 Id. § 4332(2)(C)(ii)-(v).
78 Id. § 4332(2)(C).
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(EA).79 An EA is a "concise public document" that "briefly provide[s] suffi-
cient evidence and analysis" to determine whether the action will signifi-
cantly affect the quality of the human environment8. If the EA leads the
agency to a "finding of no significant impact" (FONSI)8 1 on the human en-
vironment, the agency does not have to prepare an EIS82 but still must make
the FONSI publicly available. 3 On the contrary, if the EA reveals that the
action will significantly affect the quality of the human environment (mean-
ing the EA does not lead to a FONSI), the agency must prepare an EIS.
The EIS is "an action-forcing device" meant to ensure that the
agency makes its decision with respect to the purposes of NEPA.8 4 The
agency also must respect "scientific integrity' 85 in preparing the EIS.86 After
an EIS has been prepared, it must "accompany the proposal [for agency
action] through the existing agency review processes. 87 According to
NEPA's regulations,88 this means that agency officials must "use the [EIS]
in making decisions" regarding the proposed action.89 So although NEPA
does not dictate the agency's ultimate decision on the proposed action,
NEPA does control the decisionmaking process by mandating consideration
of the EIS. Thus, the EIS requirement embodies the spirit of NEPA, which
"declares that it is the continuing policy of the Federal Government ... to
use all practicable means and measures ... to foster and promote the gen-
eral welfare, to create and maintain conditions under which man and nature
can exist in productive harmony, and fulfill the social, economic, and other
requirements of present and future generations of Americans.' 90 President
Richard Nixon's signing of NEPA on January 1, 1970 commenced the "en-
vironmental decade," and NEPA "has been hailed as one of the nation's
79 40 C.F.R. § 1508.9 (2006).
80 Id. § 1508.9(a)(1).
81 40 C.F.R. § 1508.13 (2006).
82 40 C.F.R. § 1501.4(e) (2006).
83 Id. § 1501.4(e)(1).
84 40 C.F.R. § 1502.1 (2006).
85 40 C.F.R. § 1502.24 (2006).
86 An EIS is a "detailed statement" that "may reach several thousand" pages in length for a
large project proposal such as the licensing of a nuclear power plant. ROBERT V. PERCIVAL ET
AL., ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION 785 (4th ed. 2003).
87 42 U.S.C. § 4332(C).
88 These binding regulations were promulgated by NEPA's Council on Environmental
Quality (CEQ) "to tell federal agencies what they must do to comply with [NEPA]." 40
C.F.R. § 1500.1(a) (2006). CEQ is responsible for "review[ing] and apprais[ing]" the extent
to which federal agencies are adhering to NEPA's underlying policy of environmental con-
sciousness. 42 U.S.C. § 4344(3) (2006).
89 40 C.F.R. § 1505.1(d) (2006).
90 42 U.S.C. § 4331(a).
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most important environmental laws."9' Courts are willing to force agencies
to comply with NEPA's provisions because those provisions promote deci-
sionmaking that respects the purposes of the Act.92
B. Past Failures to Achieve Article III Standing
Anyone who sues an agency pursuant to NEPA must establish both
Article III standing and Administrative Procedure Act (APA)93 standing.
This Note focuses solely on Article III standing, since it fundamentally pre-
cedes APA standing and the question of APA standing94 generally has not
been disputed in climate change lawsuits. As articulated by the Supreme
Court in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, the requisite elements of Article III
standing to be established by the plaintiff in any federal case are (1) injury
in fact, (2) causation, and (3) redressability.95 This Section describes two
NEPA cases in the early-i 990s, Foundation on Economic Trends v. Watkins
and City of Los Angeles v. National Highway Traffic Safety Administration,
where the plaintiffs sought to compel government agencies to prepare envi-
ronmental impact statements on the climate change impacts of their actions.
The discussion of these two cases is an attempt to illuminate the meaning of
"injury in fact" and "causation" as those terms apply to Article III standing.
The defendants in each case contested whether the plaintiffs had
standing to sue. In Watkins,96 the U.S. District Court for the District of Co-
lumbia initially ruled that the plaintiffs had met the standing requirements,
but two years later reversed its own ruling in light of an intervening circuit
court decision pertaining to standing requirements. Likewise, in City of Los
Angeles, the District of Columbia Circuit Court granted the plaintiffs stand-
ing, but six years later, the circuit overruled that opinion in light of the in-
91 Bradley C. Karkkainen, Toward a Smarter NEPA: Monitoring and Managing Govern-
ment's Environmental Performance, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 903, 904 (2002).
92 See Lawrence Gerschwer, Note, Informational Standing Under NEPA: Justiciability
and the Environmental Decisionmaking Process, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 996, 1001 (1993).
93 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-706 (2006).
94 For a summation of the APA standing requirements, see, e.g., Fla. Audubon Soc y v.
Bentsen, 94 F.3d 658, 665 (D.C. Cir. 1996) ("In order to invoke judicial review of an alleged
violation under the APA, a private individual must be 'adversely affected or aggrieved...
within the meaning' of NEPA by some final agency action." (quoting Lujan v. Nat'l Wildlife
Fed'n, 497 U.S. 871, 882-83 (1990).
95 See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992) (citations omitted).
The enunciation of Article III standing doctrine in Lujan was cited with approval in the
Court's most recent discussion of the subject. See Friends of the Earth v. Laidlaw Envtl.
Services, 528 U.S. 167, 180-81 (2000). See infra Part IV for a detailed discussion of Lujan
in the context of the Watson ruling.
96 In reading this Note, remember that "Watkins" is the D.C. district court case, while
"Watson" is the California district court case that is the subject of this Note.
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tervening Lujan decision, which greatly affected standing jurisprudence.97
The factual reasons and legal rationales for these reversals help to illustrate
the requirements for climate change plaintiffs to achieve Article III standing
pursuant to NEPA.
1. The "Injury in Fact" Element: Courts Renounce "Informational
Standing"
The first element of Article III standing, "injury in fact" comprises
an injury that is both (a) "concrete and particularized" and (b) "actual or
imminent., 98 The theory of "informational standing" and, its subsequent
demise illustrate the limits of what constitutes a "concrete and particular-
ized" injury. The theory of informational standing holds that an environ-
mental group may sue a government agency for its failure to prepare an EIS,
if the group requires the information produced by the EIS to perform the
functions that are the group's raison d'etre.99 In 1990, two years before the
Supreme Court decided Lujan, the U.S. District Court for the District of
Columbia explicitly recognized the validity of informational standing in a
climate change lawsuit involving government agencies and their NEPA
obligations. 00 In this case, Foundation on Economic Trends v. Watkins, the
plaintiffs alleged that the defendants-the U.S. Energy, Interior and Agri-
culture Departments-were required to address the greenhouse effect in
their environmental impact statements on programs and actions that produce
greenhouse gases. 10' The plaintiffs claimed that their "injury in fact" was an
impairment of their "informational, educational, and activist functions" due
to the defendants' failure to comply with NEPA.10 2 The defendants filed a
motion to dismiss contending that the plaintiffs lacked standing because
their alleged injury was not "distinct and palpable," i.e., "concrete and par-
ticularized." The district court denied the motion and ruled that plaintiffs
had standing, noting that informational standing was "well-recognized" in
the District of Columbia Circuit. 10 3 The court also suggested that the pur-
97 Cass R. Sunstein, What's Standing After Lujan? Of Citizen Suits, "Injuries, "and Article
111, 91 MICH. L. REV. 163, 164-65 (1992) (noting that Lujan "significantly shifts the law of
standing").
98 Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560 (citations omitted).
99 See Gerschwer, supra note 92, at 998. These functions include, inter alia, "the collec-
tion, analysis, and dissemination of information on the environmental effects of government
actions." Id.
10o Found. on Econ. Trends v. Watkins, 731 F. Supp. 530 (D.D.C. 1990) (order denying
motion to dismiss).
101 Id.
102 Id. at 532.
103 Id. (citations omitted).
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poses of NEPA supported the theory of informational standing. 1°4 The
court's endorsement of informational standing, however, would not endure.
After the district court denied the Watkins defendants' motion to
dismiss, and during the course of briefing on defendants' subsequent motion
for summary judgment, the District of Columbia Circuit Court decided
Foundation on Economic Trends v. Lyng.10 5 In Lyng, the plaintiffs06 sued to
compel the Department of Agriculture to prepare an EIS for its "germplasm
preservation program."' 0 7 The plaintiffs did not allege that any of their
members personally had been harmed by the agency's failure to prepare an
EIS; they merely asserted that the germplasm program was inadequate in
numerous ways and that they needed the information that would be con-
tained in an EIS to inform their members about the issues raised by the
germplasm program. 10 8 On cross-motions for summary judgment, the dis-
trict court had dismissed the case, finding that plaintiffs had failed to state a
cause of action under NEPA. 10 9 On appeal, the circuit court did not rule on
the issue of whether plaintiffs had established an injury in fact (defendants
had not contested the issue before the district court' 10) but discussed the
issue at length.11' Specifically, the circuit court stated, "we have never sus-
tained an organization's standing in a NEPA case solely on the basis of 'in-
formational injury."" 1 2 The court expressed concern that recognizing the
legitimacy of informational injury "would potentially eliminate any stand-
ing requirement in NEPA cases" because it would trivialize the causation
and redressability requirements as well. If lack of information is the injury,
it necessarily follows that the injury is caused by the agency's failure to
prepare an EIS. Further, it follows that the injury can be redressed by com-
pelling the agency to prepare an EIS. 113 So without formally renouncing the
104 See id. ("The purpose of preparing environmental documentation under NEPA is to
provide information.") (citations omitted).
105 943 F.2d 79 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
106 Foundation on Economic Trends is a private non-profit organization "active on issues of
biotechnology and genetics engineering." Id. at 80.
107 Id. The word "germplasm" means the maintenance of plants "for the purposes of study,
breeding or genetic research." Id.
108 Id. at 82, 85.
109 Id. at 82. The court held that the plaintiffs had not identified any particular action by the
Department of Agriculture that would require the Department to prepare an EIS under
NEPA. Id.
11o Id.
'11 See id. at 82-85. The court did not find it necessary to rule on the injury in fact issue
because it held that the plaintiffs lacked standing to sue because they had not challenged a
particular "agency action" under the APA. Id. at 86-87.
112 Id. at 84.
113 Id.
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theory of informational standing, the circuit court evinced its strong disap-
proval of it.
The district court got the message. In 1992, the court reversed its
earlier decision and granted the Watkins defendants' motion for summary
judgment, ruling that the plaintiffs did not have standing. 114 In so doing, the
court noted that Lyng had "reexamined the informational standing concept
and found it wanting." ' 1 5 The plaintiffs protested that Lyng's criticism of
informational standing was merely dicta, but to no avail."H6 The court now
emphasized that to support standing, the plaintiff's injury must be "particu-
larized," meaning different from an injury suffered by the public at large."17
Detriment to "plaintiffs' programmatic activities in disseminating informa-
tion about the greenhouse effect to the public" did not qualify as such an
injury. Lyng had explained that the theory of informational standing was
untenable because it would confer standing on plaintiffs whose injury is
tantamount to "a mere interest in a problem. ' 18 This conferral could poten-
tially vitiate the standing requirement in NEPA cases.' 9 Thus, reflecting the
court of appeals' concern that recognition of informational standing would
wrongly dilute NEPA standing jurisprudence, the Watkins court resolved
that the defendants had been right when they filed their motion to dismiss:
the plaintiffs' alleged injury was not "distinct and palpable," and therefore
they had failed to meet the "injury in fact" requirement of standing. 120 That
reasoning is consonant with the Supreme Court's interpretation of Article
III standing. Less than two months after the D.C. District Court granted the
Watkins defendants' motion for summary judgment, the Supreme Court
decided Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, emphasizing that a showing of "par-
ticularized injury" is necessary for a plaintiff to attain standing in federal
Court.
12 1
114 Found. on Econ. Trends v. Watkins, 794 F. Supp. 395 (D.D.C. 1992).
... Id. at 398 (citing Found. on Econ. Trends v. Lyng, 943 F.2d 79, 82-85 (D.C. Cir.
1991)).
1"6 Id. at 399.
117 Id. at 397.
118 See Found. on Econ. Trends v. Lyng, 943 F.2d at 85 ("The Supreme Court [in Sierra
Club v. Morton] held ... that "a mere 'interest in a problem,' no matter how long-standing
the interest and no matter how qualified the organization is in evaluating the problem," is not
sufficient to confer standing." (quoting Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 739 (1972))).
119 Watkins, 794 F. Supp. at 398 ("If [informational] injury alone were sufficient [to confer
standing], a prospective plaintiff could bestow standing upon itself in every case merely by
requesting the agency to prepare the detailed statement NEPA contemplates." (quoting
Found. on Econ. Trends v. Lyng, 943 F.2d at 85)).
120 Watkins, 794 F. Supp. at 399.
12, See 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992). The Court defined "particularized injury" as an injury
that affects the plaintiff in a "personal and individual way." Id. at 561 n. 1.
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2. The Causation Element: Courts Endorse a More Stringent Test
City of Los Angeles v. National Highway Traffic Safety Administra-
tion,'22 a 1990 District of Columbia Court of Appeals case, involved the
National Resources Defense Council (NRDC) and the National Highway
Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA). NRDC argued that NHTSA was
required to prepare an EIS pursuant to NEPA for its decision to set the 1989
Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) standard at 26.5 miles per gallon
rather than the 27.5 miles per gallon contemplated by the Energy Policy and
Conservation Act of 1975.123 NRDC alleged that this difference would re-
sult in increased greenhouse gas emissions from cars, contributing to global
warming that damaged natural areas used by NRDC's members for recrea-
tional and economic purposes. 124 Two of the three circuit judges on the
panel, including Ruth Bader Ginsburg, found that NRDC had established
standing.12 5 All three judges concluded that the plaintiffs had established an
injury in fact.126 Addressing causation in his opinion for the court, Judge
Wald wrote that the plaintiffs needed only to "show a reasonable likelihood
that if NHTSA performed an [EIS], it would arrive at a different conclusion
about the CAFE rollback." '127 That is, the plaintiffs had to show only a rea-
sonable likelihood that NHTSA's failure to prepare an EIS caused the deci-
sion to "roll back" the standard, which in turn caused the plaintiffs' injuries.
On redressability, the court held that the plaintiffs were not required to show
that NHTSA's preparation of an EIS would effect any alleviation of climate
change. The plaintiffs only had to show that compelling NHTSA to do so
would "redress" their injuries insofar as "any serious effects in global
warming will not be overlooked."'128 However, like the theory of informa-
tional standing in Watkins, the Wald panel's relatively expansive interpreta-
122 City of Los Angeles v. Nat'l Highway Traffic Safety Admin., 912 F.2d 478 (D.C. Cir.
1990), overruled by Fla. Audubon Soc'y v. Bentsen, 94 F.3d 658 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
123 See id. at 482.
124 Id. at 483.
125 In dissent (but only on the issue of standing), Judge D.H. Ginsberg argued that NRDC
lacked standing because it could establish neither causation nor redressability. See id.
("While the foregoing allegations make out an injury indeed, the NRDC has failed to explain
how that injury can be traced causally to the challenged decision and how the relief it seeks
could redress the harm it foresees.").
126 See id.
127 Id. at 497 (emphasis added).
128 Id. at 499. See also David R. Hodas, Standing and Climate Change: Can Anyone Com-
plain About the Weather?, 15 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 451, 476 (2000) ("Similarly, just as
the correct causation test was 'some likelihood' that an EIS would influence the ultimate
decision, so, with respect to redressability, the test is not whether changing the CAFE deci-
sion would reduce global warming, but whether 'an EIS would redress its asserted injury,
i.e., that any serious effects in global warming will not be overlooked."').
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tion of Article III standing doctrine in City of Los Angeles subsequently
would be rejected by the District of Columbia Court of Appeals.
That rejection transpired in 1996 when the District of Columbia
Court of Appeals reviewed Florida Audubon Society v. Bentsen, a case in-
volving plaintiffs who sued to compel preparation of an EIS for the Treas-
ury Secretary's authorization of a tax credit for ethyl tertiary butyl ether
(ETBE), an alternative fuel additive.129 The plaintiffs alleged that the tax
credit ultimately would lead to increased agricultural cultivation which
would inflict environmental damage on wildlife areas enjoyed by plain-
tiffs. 3° Affirming the district court's ruling, the circuit court en banc held
that the plaintiffs lacked standing because they had established neither in-
jury in fact nor causation.13" ' In so doing, the court explicitly overruled the
Wald panel's causation analysis in City of Los Angeles, finding that it "[did]
not conform to the Supreme Court's discussion of procedural rights stand-
ing in Lujan."'132 The court reasoned that an "adequate causal chain" in a
NEPA case must comprise "at least two links": first, connecting the absence
of an EIS to "some substantive government decision," and second, connect-
ing that substantive decision to "the plaintiffs particularized injury. 133 By
holding that the plaintiffs had to establish only a "reasonable likelihood"
that preparing an EIS would alter the government's decision, City of Los
Angeles had placed too much emphasis on the first link in the causal chain
and given only cursory consideration to the second. The circuit court now
held the appropriate test as whether there is a "substantial probability" that
the government's decision, made without the EIS, created or increased a
"demonstrable risk" of injury to the plaintiffs particularized interests. 134
Thus, Florida Audubon Society endorsed a more stringent causation analy-
sis in two respects: the causation standard of "reasonable likelihood" used in
City of Los Angeles had become "substantial probability, ' 135 and the injury
129 Fla. Audubon Soc'y v. Bentsen, 94 F.3d 658 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
130 See id. at 662 ("[Plaintiffs argue] that the tax credit, by increasing the market for ETBE,
would stimulate production of the corn, sugar cane and sugar beets necessary to make the
ethanol from which ETBE is derived, and that this increased crop production would, in turn,
necessarily result in more agricultural cultivation, with its accompanying environmental
dangers, in regions that border wildlife areas [plaintiffs] (or their members) use and enjoy.").
"' Id. at 672.
132 See id. at 668-69.
' Id. at 668.
134 Id. at 668-69.
135 The Watson ruling, discussed infra Part IV, applies the Supreme Court's "fairly trace-
able" causation standard, expounded in Lujan, not the District of Columbia circuit court's
"substantial probability" standard in Florida Audubon Society. The District of Columbia
Circuit formulated its "substantial probability" standard from a Supreme Court case involv-
ing plaintiffs who challenged zoning laws that allegedly violated their constitutional and civil
rights by denying them access to low-cost housing. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975). In
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vis-2i-vis causation must be a substantive one, and not mere agency neglect
to prepare an EIS.
C. The Supreme Court's "Constrained" Articulation ofArticle III
Standing
The Supreme Court most recently defined the boundaries of Article
III standing in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 13 6 which Courts and commen-
tators widely perceived as constraining those boundaries. 137 Environmental
groups challenged the Secretary of the Interior's rule that the Endangered
Species Act of 1973 (ESA)1 38 did not apply to government action taken in
foreign nations. The district court denied the Secretary's motion for sum-
mary judgment on the ground that the plaintiffs lacked standing and granted
the plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment on the merits. The Court of
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's order denying the
Secretary's motion and requiring the Secretary to publish a new rule that the
ESA did apply in foreign nations.1 39 The Court's opinion, authored by Jus-
tice Scalia, addressed only the issue of whether the plaintiffs had standing to
sue and held that the court of appeals had erred in denying the Secretary's
motion for summary judgment. The Court found three "irreducible" ele-
ments of constitutional standing:
Warth, the Court held that the plaintiffs had failed to establish causation because they did not
allege facts from which the Court could reasonably infer that, in the absence of the zoning
laws, a "substantial probability" existed that they would have been able to obtain the low-
cost housing. See id. at 504. The Supreme Court required the plaintiffs to show a "substantial
probability" that their injury in fact (inability to obtain housing) would not exist in the ab-
sence of the alleged violations. In contrast, the District of Columbia Circuit applied the "sub-
stantial probability" language to the actions of the defendant in causing the injury, not to the
plaintiff's injury itself. Thus, the District of Columbia Circuit's causation standard is an
innovation, and lacks robust support from its putative precedent. At least one other circuit
court has also criticized Florida Audubon Society's formulation of the causation standard for
"confus[ing] the issue of the likelihood of the harm, which is better addressed in the injury in
fact prong of the analysis, with its cause." Comm. to Save the Rio Hondo v. Lucero, 102
F.3d 445, 451 (10th Cir. 1996).
136 504 U.S. 555 (1992).
137 See, e.g., Sunstein, supra note 97, at 165 ("[Lujan] held that Article III required invali-
dation of an explicit congressional grant of standing to 'citizens.' The Court had not an-
swered this question before." (footnote omitted)); Thomas 0. Sargentich, The Supreme
Court's Administrative Law Jurisprudence, 7 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 273, 273 (1993) ("[Flour
Justices in Lujan-Justices Scalia, Rehnquist, White, and Thomas--enunciated a particularly
constrained vision of the standing doctrine." (footnote omitted)).
138 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (2006).
139 Lujan, 504 U.S. at 559. Originally, the district court ruled that the plaintiffs lacked
standing and dismissed the case, but a divided court of appeals reversed that ruling and re-
manded the case, whereupon the district court ruled for the plaintiffs on the merits. Id.
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First, the plaintiff must have suffered an "injury in fact"-an invasion of a
legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized and (b)
"actual or imminent, not 'conjectural' or 'hypothetical."' Second, there
must be a causal connection between the injury and the conduct com-
plained of-the injury has to be "fairly ... trace[able] to the challenged
action of the defendant, and not ... the result of the independent action of
some third party not before the court." Third, it must be "likely," as op-
posed to merely "speculative," that the injury will be redressed by a favor-
able decision. 140
Regarding "injury in fact," the Court noted that "particularized" meant "that
the injury must affect the plaintiff in a personal and individual way."' 4'1 It
was this "particularity" requirement that invalidated the theory informa-
tional standing, according to Foundation on Economic Trends v. Watkins, 1
42
which was decided just a few months before Lujan.
Before discussing these standing requirements in application to the
facts, the Court distinguished between two paradigmatic cases against the
government: one where the plaintiff "is himself an object" of government
action or inaction and another where the plaintiff is not. In the latter case,
where the plaintiffs injury necessarily stems from government action or
inaction with respect to a third party, the Court stated that "it is ordinarily
'substantially more difficult' to establish [standing].' 43 In support of this
proposition, the Court noted that causation and redressability in such cases
"hinge on" the choices of third parties not before the court, and so plaintiffs
bear an additional burden to show that those third parties' choices "have
been or will be made in such manner as to produce causation and permit
redressability of injury."144 Lujan was one of these latter cases.
1. The Lujan Court on "Injury in Fact"
When the D.C. District Court in Watkins reversed its earlier grant of
standing, it resolved that the plaintiffs' injuries lacked concreteness and
particularity. In contrast, the Supreme Court in Lujan rejected the plaintiffs'
injuries because those injuries were not "imminent." The Lujan plaintiffs
posited that they had sustained injuries related the Secretary's decision not
to apply the ESA overseas. For example, Defenders of Wildlife members
stated that they had previously traveled to foreign nations to observe endan-
gered animals whose populations further would be threatened by the Secre-
140 Id. at 560-61 (citations and footnotes omitted).
141 Id. at 560 n.1.
142 See supra Part II.B.1.
"' Lujan, 504 U.S. at 562 (citations omitted).
144 Id. (citation omitted).
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tary's rule. Their affidavits indicated that they intended to return to these
nations to observe the animals but had not decided or planned exactly when
they would do so.' 45 This lack of specificity was crucial, as the Court held
that "such 'some day' intentions" are insufficient to meet the imminence
requirement of injury in fact. 146 Thus, while the Court implicitly acknowl-
edged that the injuries alleged in plaintiffs' affidavits were "concrete," it
held that those injuries were not imminent.
As an alternative to the injuries alleged in the affidavits, plaintiffs
submitted three different "nexus" theories as the basis of standing. In some
NEPA cases, courts have upheld a plaintiffs standing under one of these
theories, using a "geographic nexus" test to determine whether there is a
sufficient connection between the plaintiff asserting the claim and the
physical location suffering the environmental impact.14 7 The Court rejected
each of these "novel" theories either as inconsistent with prior decisions or
simply "beyond all reason."'
48
2. The Lujan Plurality on Redressability
Next, the Court addressed the issue of redressability. This section of
Justice Scalia's opinion garnered only a plurality of the Court, with Chief
Justice Rehnquist, Justice White and Justice Thomas joining it. The Court
posited that the plaintiffs had failed to establish redressability because it was
uncertain whether government agencies would be bound by the Secretary's
rule that ESA applied overseas. The agencies, which funded the projects
that would be subject to ESA regulation, were not parties to the case. De-
spite the Secretary's express belief that his rule was binding on the agen-
cies, 149 the Court believed that the agencies might not be bound because the
Solicitor General had taken the position that they were not bound, and be-
145 Id. at 563-64.
146 Id. at 564. The two dissenting Justices, Justice Blackmun and Justice O'Connor, be-
lieved that the lack of specific plans was a trivial deficiency, since the plaintiffs could easily
purchase plane tickets to the areas where the endangered animals were located, and thereby
presumably vitiate the deficiency identified by the Court. Id. at 592 (Blackmun, J., dissent-
ing). The dissenting Justices also noted the "genuine issue of material fact" standard neces-
sary to survive a motion for summary judgment, and posited that a reasonable factfinder
could conclude that the plaintiffs would return to the areas, based on the plaintiffs' having
"the requisite resources and personal interest in the preservation of the species." Id. at 590,
592.
147 See Cantrell v. City of Long Beach, 241 F.3d 674, 679 (9th Cir. 2001) ("In NEPA cases,
we have described this "concrete interest" test as requiring a "geographic nexus" between the
individual asserting the claim and the location suffering an environmental impact." (citing
Douglas County v. Babbitt, 48 F.3d 1495, 1500 n.5 (9th Cir. 1995))).
148 Lujan, 504 U.S. at 565-67.
149 Id. at 595-96 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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cause the agencies themselves were unclear on this issue.' 50 As another mat-
ter, noting that the agencies generally provided "only a fraction" of total
project funding, the Court stated that the plaintiffs had produced no evi-
dence to show that the agency-supported projects would not transpire with-
out agency funding.151 Thus, the Court found that alleged harm to the en-
dangered species would not be mitigated by a rule prohibiting agency fund-
ing of the projects.152
3. The Lujan Court Rejects "Congressional Conferral" of Standing
The Court's majority returns for the next part of the opinion, which
held that the "citizen-suit" provision of the ESA did not create a basis for
standing independent of Article III's requirements. These provisions, in-
cluded in many environmental statutes, generally allow a person to sue for
injunctive relief against a government agency that is in violation of the par-
ticular statute. The court of appeals had granted the plaintiffs standing pur-
suant to this provision of the ESA. The Supreme Court rejected this "con-
gressional conferral" to citizens of a "self-contained" procedural right to
have the Executive branch observe the law.1 53 Recognizing this "procedural
right," according to the Court, would be "[v]indicating the public interest,"
and hence permitting the courts to function outside of their proper constitu-
tional role of protecting the rights of private individuals. 54 Thus, only the
courts, and not Congress, may determine whether a federal plaintiff has
standing to sue.
Reading Lujan's description of the three "irreducible" elements of
standing 155 effectively explains why the climate change plaintiffs in Foun-
dation on Economic Trends v. Watkins were ultimately denied standing, and
why the Wald panel's lenient causation analysis in City of Los Angeles v.
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration was ultimately overruled.
The "informational injury" of Watkins is not an injury in fact because it is
not "concrete and particularized.' ' 156 Likewise, the failure to prepare an EIS
in City of Los Angeles, even if it causes the agency to make a "bad" deci-
150 Id. at 568-69.
' Id. at 571. Likewise to their objections to the Court's injury in fact analysis, the dissent-
ing Justices thought there was at least a genuine issue of fact regarding whether the projects
would be deterred by lack of agency funding. Id. at 599 ("Even if the ... agencies supply
only a fraction of the funding for a particular foreign project, it remains at least a question for
the finder of fact whether threatened withdrawal of that fraction would affect foreign gov-
ernment conduct sufficiently to avoid harm to listed species.").
152 Id. at 571.
... Id. at 573.
114 See id. at 576.
155 See supra text accompanying note 140.
156 See supra text accompanying note 140.
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sion, does not constitute "causation" unless the bad decision causes an in-
jury in fact (as described by Lujan) to the plaintiff. Thus, Lujan clarifies the
discussion of those cases 157 and articulates what a federal court plaintiff
must demonstrate to establish standing.
III. FRIENDS OF THE EARTH V. WATSON: A PERSUASIVE CASE FOR STANDING
Although scientists recognized the greenhouse effect and the possi-
bility of anthropogenic global climate change in the early 1970s (and be-
fore), 158 a consensus on the potential scope of the problem has emerged only
in the past two decades, as continually improving methods and models al-
low for more accuracy and less uncertainty in the field. Accordingly, the
idea of any type of litigation based on climate change is a recent develop-
ment.1 59 The Plaintiffs of Friends of the Earth v. Watson have effectively
utilized this improved science to attain Article III standing. A detailed de-
scription of the case will distinguish it from the failed climate change law-
suits discussed in Part II.
A. The Basic Legal Approach
The Defendants in Friends of the Earth v. Watson are the Overseas
Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) and Export-Import Bank of the
United States (Ex-Im). 160 OPIC and Ex-Im are government agencies that
"provide insurance, loans, and loan guarantees for overseas projects or to
U.S. companies that invest in overseas projects,1 61 many of which are fossil
fuel- and energy-related. The Plaintiffs, environmental organizations and
cities, 1 62 claim that these projects are the source of significant greenhouse
157 See supra Part II.B.I, I.B.2.
158 See Kristen Choo, Feeling the Heat: The Growing Debate over Climate Change Takes
on Legal Overtones, A.B.A. J., July 2006, at 29, 30-31 (noting that Swedish scientist Svante
August Arrhenius recognized the greenhouse effect in 1896).
159 David A. Grossman, Warming Up to a Not-So-Radical Idea: Tort-Based Climate
Change Litigation, 28 COLtJM. J. ENVTL. L. 1, 2 (2003). See this article for a detailed discus-
sion of the viability of applying a tort framework in climate change litigation.
160 In the lawsuit, the formal defendants are: (1) Peter Watson, in his official capacity as
President and CEO of OPIC, and (2) Phillip Merrill, in his official capacity as Vice Chair-
man and First Vice President of Ex-Im. Amended Complaint (Second) at 1, Friends of the
Earth v. Watson, No. C 02-4106, at 1 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 16, 2004) [hereinafter Complaint],
available at http://climatelawsuit.org/documents/Complaint_2AmendedDeclrlnjRelief.
pdf.
161 Id. at 2.
162 The environmental plaintiffs are: (1) Friends of the Earth, Inc. and (2) Greenpeace, Inc.
Id. at 1. The city plaintiffs are: (3) Boulder, Colorado, (4) Oakland, California, (5) Arcata,
California, and (6) Santa Monica, California. Id.
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gas emissions-eight percent of the world's total.163 For example, Ex-Im
approved more than $1.5 billion in loans and loan guarantees to finance
contracts that allowed U.S. companies to provide services and supplies for
oil and natural gas extraction in the Cantarell oil fields of Mexico.' 64 Can-
tarell produces up to four hundred million barrels of oil per year for export
to world markets. 165 When this oil is combusted or burned as fuel, it releases
greenhouse gases into the atmosphere. These greenhouse gas emissions
contribute to global climate change, 166 the force of past, present and future
harm to Plaintiffs and their interests. NEPA requires "all agencies of the
Federal Government" to prepare an EIS on proposals for "major Federal
actions significantly affecting the quality of the human environment.' ' 167 Ex-
Im did not prepare an EIS on its actions related to the Cantarell oil fields.
Nor did Ex-Im prepare an EA and publish a FONSI to establish that an EIS
is unnecessary. 168 Plaintiffs cite numerous other OPIC- and Ex-Im-
supported projects to illustrate the scope of the agencies' actions, allegedly
taken without complying with NEPA. 169 Plaintiffs claim authority to sue
under the Administrative Procedure Act. 170
B. The Plaintiffs' Injuries
As Plaintiffs in this lawsuit, Friends of the Earth and Greenpeace
are representing 171 their members, including Arthur and Anne Berndt 172 and
163 See Declaration of Richard Heede at 12, Friends of the Earth v. Watson, No. C 02-4106
(N.D. Cal. Aug. 23, 2005) [hereinafter Heede Declaration] ("Combined Ex-Im and OPIC
emissions of carbon dioxide and methane total 1,911 million tones of carbon dioxide-
equivalent on an annual basis. This equals nearly 8 percent of the world's emissions of car-
bon dioxide.") (emphasis in original) (footnote omitted), http://climatelawsuit.org/documen
ts/Declr Heede.pdf.
164 Complaint, supra note 160, at 40-41.
165 Id. at 41. Defendants' projects primarily export oil to the U.S., Western Europe, and
Japan. Id. at 36-37.
166 See id. at 2.
167 42 U.S.C. § 4332(C).
168 See generally supra Part II.A (explaining NEPA's requirements).
169 Complaint, supra note 160, at 39-46.
170 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-706. See generally Fla. Audubon Soc'y v. Bentsen, 94 F.3d 658, 665
(D.C. Cir. 1996) ("In order to invoke judicial review of an alleged violation under the APA, a
private individual must be 'adversely affected or aggrieved... within the meaning' of NEPA
by some final agency action." (quoting Lujan v. Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n, 497 U.S. 871, 882-
83)).
171 In general, an organization may sue on behalf of its members when three conditions
apply: (1) an organization's member would have standing to sue in her own right, (2) the
interests at issue in the suit are germane to the organization's purpose, and (3) the individual
member's participation in the suit is not necessary to the claim or requested relief. Hunt v.
Wash. State Apple Adver. Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333,343 (1977).
172 See supra Introduction (describing the impact of climate change on the Berndts' farm).
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others discussed below. Four cities are also Plaintiffs: Boulder, Colorado
and Oakland, Arcata, and Santa Monica, California. Together the Plaintiffs'
injuries catalog the myriad detrimental effects of climate change. In part,
these effects include the familiar, direct consequences of "global warming."
For example, the city of Santa Monica claims that the sea level rise over the
twenty-first century will cause increased "beach erosion and loss of sand."
This will compromise the city's tourism-based economy, as the beach incurs
damage and becomes less appealing to tourists. 173 The American public is
familiar with the idea that global warming causes the sea level to rise,
though the magnitude of the rise is uncertain. On the contrary, the public is
likely unfamiliar with some of climate change's indirect effects, also injuri-
ous to Plaintiffs. For example, on Alaska's Kenai Peninsula, climate change
allows the spruce bark beetle to reproduce at twice its normal rate. 74 The
beetle eats spruce trees, and previously lived in ecological balance with the
trees. Now, its increased population and accelerated life cycle have greatly
disrupted that balance. 75 The result is four million acres of dead spruce
forest (thirty-eight million dead trees), the largest insect-related tree loss
known to have occurred in North America. 76 The massive dead forest pre-
sents a significant fire danger (exacerbated by rising temperatures), as well
as detracts from Alaska's aesthetic appeal. Greenpeace member Melanie
Duchin of Anchorage, Alaska, hikes, kayaks and sails in areas on the Kenai
Peninsula every summer. Climate change thus impairs Ms. Duchin's recrea-
tional activities on the Peninsula by increasing the incidents of forest fire
and diminishing the natural beauty of the area. 17
Friends of the Earth member Dr. Phillip Dustan, a biology professor
at the College of Charleston in South Carolina, began researching coral
reefs off the Florida Keys in 1969. Since 1995, he has served as a principal
investigator on the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency's Florida Keys
Coral Monitoring Project. The "living coral cover" is decreasing dramati-
cally on these reefs, and climate change is a "significant factor" in this
173 Complaint, supra note 160, at 30-31.
174 Id. at 14.
175 World View of Global Warming, Global Warming in Alaska, http://www.worldviewo
fglobalwarming.org/pages/alaska3.html (last visited Mar. 6, 2006) ("Scientists, including Dr.
Edward Berg and Dr. Kenneth Raffa, attribute the beetle infestation to rising average tem-
peratures in South-Central Alaska in both winter and summer. More beetle larvae can sur-
vive, and higher summer temperatures allow the insects to mature faster and complete a two-
year life cyle [sic] in one year. The trees, which previously lived in balance with the beetles,
do not have enough natural defenses against this assault.").
176 Complaint, supra note 160, at 14.
177 Id. at 19-20.
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loss, 178 which diminishes Dr. Dustan's ability to pursue his profession of
conducting biological research. He says he can no longer "keep [his] head in
the sand and keep studying the pure physiology and evolutionary biology of
corals" without speaking up on the damage of climate change to the cor-
als. 7 9 His main recreational activity, scuba diving, is less enjoyable now
because there are far fewer fish on the reefs, which are unhealthy and much
smaller than they were a decade ago. Dr. Dustan and his family are cur-
rently building a home on John's Island (ten miles southwest of Charles-
ton), 80 which they have chosen to construct "higher and stronger than re-
quired by current [building] code," at a significant additional expense. This
choice is the result of predicted increases in sea level, storm surge' 8' fre-
quency and heights, and hurricane severity, all caused by global climate
change. 82 Thus, climate change is detrimental to Dr. Dustan's professional,
recreational and economic interests.
The city of Boulder, Colorado supplies its citizens with drinking
water primarily from mountain snow-pack. According to the Complaint,
Boulder's snow-pack at upper elevations is only 25% of its normal aver-
age. 183 The snow-pack at lower elevations was completely gone when
measured in April of 2002, "a condition never seen in the many decades of
record keeping."' 184 The city is concerned about its vulnerability to flash
flooding, as many citizens live and work in the Boulder Creek floodplain,
and expects increased rainfall intensities associated with climate change to
heighten this risk.8 5 Climate change thus threatens Boulder's interests in
maintaining the health and safety of its citizens.
C. The Plaintiffs' Scientific Evidence
Several of the Plaintiffs' specific alleged injuries are consonant with
the U.S. government's own assessment of the impacts of global climate
change. For instance, as noted in the Introduction, the 2002 U.S. Climate
Action Report predicts that Arthur and Anne Berndt's sugar maple trees will
171 Id. at 15-16 ("Combined with earlier studies dating from 1974, the Carysfort Reef [in
the northern Florida Keys] has lost over 90% of its living coral cover. This reef is in a has-
tened state of ecological collapse.").
171 Id. at 16.
180 Their home will be "built on the shore of an estuary known as Stono River, approxi-
mately 5.5 miles from the ocean and on land eight feet above sea level." Id.
181 "Storm surge" refers to "water that is pushed toward the shore by the force of the winds
swirling around the storm." National Hurricane Center, Storm Surge, http://www.nhc.noa
a.gov/HAW2/english/storm-surge.shtml (last visited Jan. 29, 2007).
182 Complaint, supra note 160, at 16-17.
' Id. at21.
184 Id.
185 id at22
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have disappeared from Maverick Farm by the end of the century. 186 More
important, however, is the fact that the Plaintiffs have enlisted a highly dis-
tinguished climate change scientist, Dr. Michael C. MacCracken, to eluci-
date the relationship between their injuries and Defendants' actions.
Dr. MacCracken has held several top positions in U.S. government
programs dedicated to studying global climate change. He was the senior
scientist at the Office of the U.S. Global Change Research Program in
Washington, D.C., from 1993 to 2002, serving as the Program's first Execu-
tive Director from 1993 to 1997, during which time he coordinated the cli-
mate change research programs of ten federal agencies. From 1997 through
2001, he was the Executive Director of the National Assessment Coordina-
tion Office, in which capacity he was a lead author of reports in 2000 and
2001 that assessed the consequences of climate change in the U.S. He also
prepared Chapter 6 of the 2002 U.S. Climate Action Report on the impacts
of climate change and possible adaptation strategies. Dr. MacCracken con-
tributed to each of the IPCC's three assessment reports187 in various capaci-
ties and currently serves as the top scientist at the Climate Institute, the old-
est non-governmental organization in Washington, D.C., dedicated to ad-
dressing the problem of global climate change.' 88 Dr. MacCracken's Decla-
ration confirms that each of Plaintiffs' alleged injuries is linked to a pro-
jected consequence of global climate change. 189 Importantly, he asserts that
these projections "reflect the strong consensus of opinion among qualified
scientific experts involved in climate change research in the U.S. and around
the world." 190
The Watson Plaintiffs allege injuries that are occurring right now,
including monetary loses and threats to public health.' 9' These are real inju-
ries that bear no resemblance to the claim of "informational injury" alleged
in Foundation on Economic Trends v. Watkins. The incredible volume192 of
greenhouse gases emissions allegedly caused by the OPIC and Ex-Im
dwarfs the volumes involved in the previously discussed climate change
lawsuits. Thus, for the purpose of determining whether the Watson plaintiffs
have standing to sue, Watson should not be prejudiced by the failure of
those previous climate change lawsuits.
186 See supra notes 18-19 and accompanying text.
187 See supra Part I for a discussion of the findings of the Third Assessment Report (TAR).
188 MacCracken Declaration, supra note 39, at 5-6.
189 See generally id.
190 Id. at 7 (emphasis added).
191 For a complete list of Plaintiffs' alleged injuries, see Complaint, supra note 160, at 11-
36.
192 See infra notes 255-56 and accompanying text.
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IV. THE WA TSON RULING: WHY IT WAS CORRECT
In its order denying the Defendants' motion for summary judgment,
the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California rejected all
arguments that the Plaintiffs lacked Article III standing., 93 The following
sections identify and evaluate the parties' opposing arguments on each ele-
ment of standing, as advanced during the briefing on Defendants' motion
for summary judgment. The sections also analyze the court's ruling on each
element and explain why it was correct. Naturally, the authority relied upon
by the parties comprises many Ninth Circuit cases, in addition to other
courts of appeals and Supreme Court cases. Considering that fact, a skeptic
might argue that the impact of the court's ruling will be limited to cases
within the Ninth Circuit's jurisdiction. The following sections demonstrate,
however, that the court's ruling is consonant even with the "constrained"
view of standing promulgated by the Supreme Court in Lujan v. Defenders
of Wildlife. 194 Consequently, the possibilities for this ruling to impact future
climate change litigation extend to all U.S. jurisdictions. 195
A. Injury in Fact
In their motion for summary judgment, the Defendants emphasized
the notion that natural forces, rather than greenhouse gas emissions, may be
the primary cause of Plaintiffs' injuries. 196 In turn, they asserted, the link
between their projects' greenhouse gas emissions and Plaintiffs' injuries is
too tenuous to support a valid injury in fact. It is unclear how this argument
purports to contest either of the two elements of injury in fact. The argu-
ment is more pertinent to the causation inquiry than the injury in fact in-
quiry; it does not contest the evidence that Plaintiffs provided to show in-
jury, but rather the cause of those injuries. In their opposition brief, Plain-
tiffs illuminated this irrelevance to the question of injury in fact. 197 For ex-
ample, Plaintiffs Arthur and Anne Berndt allege that they are currently suf-
fering and will continue to suffer a specific pecuniary loss: loss of maple
syrup revenue due to the deterioration of their farm caused by climate
change. Rationally, no amount of uncertainty about the causes of climate
change can impeach the fact that the Bemdts have suffered an injury.
193 Order Denying MSJ, supra note 25.
194 504 U.S. 555 (1992).
195 See discussion infra Part V.
196 MSJ, supra note 27, at 11-12.
197 Opposition to MSJ, supra note 28, at 20. In the brief, the Plaintiffs cite the Supreme
Court's decision in Friends of the Earth v. Laidlaw Environmental Services, 528 U.S. 167,
184 (2000), for the proposition that a plaintiff's "reasonable" concern that an injury will
occur constitutes a valid injury in fact. Opposition to MSJ, supra note 28, at 20.
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The Defendants contended that climate change science offers no
support for some of Plaintiffs' injuries, which should render Plaintiffs' inju-
ries insufficiently "actual or imminent." For example, they cited an IPCC
report discerning "no significant trends" in hurricane intensity over the
twentieth century outside of natural variations.198 This would purportedly
undermine, among others, Dr. Dustan's injury of paying more for his home,
expecting a future increase in hurricane intensity. The Plaintiffs replied that
they were not required to "provide specific proof of actual environmental
harm" in order to demonstrate injury in fact and cited Ninth Circuit cases to
support this point.' 99 Plaintiffs' rebuttal (and its supporting cases) agrees
with Friends of the Earth v. Laidlaw Environmental Services, where the
Supreme Court held that the plaintiffs "reasonable concern" about the per-
nicious effects of the defendant company's illegal pollutant discharges into
a river, which deterred him from exercising a recreational interest in the
river, was sufficient to constitute an injury in fact.200 The Defendants also
claimed that the Plaintiffs alleged "conjectural future impacts" of climate
change that were "too remote" (insufficiently actual or imminent) to support
standing under Lujan.201 However, the Plaintiffs' Complaint and declara-
tions allege not only future impacts of climate change but also "impacts
[that] are already affecting Plaintiffs' interests. '" 20 2
Before addressing these specific countervailing arguments on stand-
ing in its order, the court mentions the often-cited20 3 footnote seven 20 4 of
Justice Scalia's opinion for the Court in Lujan.20 5 That footnote pertains to
cases in which a plaintiff alleges that a procedural violation has impaired his
"separate concrete interest. ' 20 6 In such a case, the Court stated that a plain-
tiff can attain Article III standing "without meeting all the normal standards
for redressability and immediacy., 20 7 The failure to prepare an EIS (or to
198 MSJ, supra note 27, at 13. For a more recent, contrary view on the relationship between
hurricanes and climate change, see Emanuel, supra note 72.
199 Opposition to MSJ, supra note 28, at 21. Plaintiffs argued that requiring such "specific
proof' would "unduly hinder" enforcement of environmental statutes. Id. (citing Ocean Ad-
vocates v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 361 F.3d 1108, 1120 (9th Cir. 2004)). Requiring
such would entail the same environmental investigation that the Plaintiffs seek to compel.
See Citizens for Better Forestry v. USDA, 341 F.3d 961, 972 (9th Cir. 2003).
200 528 U.S. at 183-85.
201 MSJ, supra note 27, at 13-14.
202 Opposition to MSJ, supra note 28, at 21 (emphasis in original).
203 See Douglas Sinor, Tenth Circuit Survey: Environmental Law, 75 DENV. U. L. REv. 859,
879 n.198 (1998) ("The procedural standing mentioned in Lujan is now sometimes referred
to simply as 'footnote seven standing."' (citation omitted)).
204 Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 572 n.7 (1992).
205 Order Denying MSJ, supra note 25, at 3-4.
206 504 U.S. at 572.
207 Id. at 572 n.7.
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determine if one is necessary) pursuant to NEPA is a procedural violation,
so the footnote pertains to Watson's standing analysis. As such, the court
cites this footnote at the outset of its standing analysis for the proposition
that the Plaintiffs are allowed "some uncertainty about redressability and
causality."2 °8
The court first addresses the Defendants' argument that the Plain-
tiffs' injuries are insufficiently imminent to support standing. Aside from
the substantial likelihood that the Plaintiffs' injuries are in fact quite immi-
nent,20 9 the court stated that the Plaintiffs were not required to show that any
particular "substantive environmental harm is imminent,"2 10 nor that the
projects supported by Defendants "will have particular environmental ef-
fects." The rationale of the court's latter statement may be deduced from the
fact that the purpose of NEPA is to detail the "adverse environmental ef-
fects" of the Defendants' projects in an EIS. 21 Thus the court held that the
Plaintiffs should not bear responsibility for doing what the Defendants have
avoided in violation of NEPA.1 2 The court's former statement enjoys sup-
port from footnote seven in Lujan, where the Court described the hypotheti-
cal NEPA case of a man whose home borders the proposed construction site
of a federally licensed dam. If the licensing agency has failed to prepare an
EIS for the dam, he may assert his procedural right to have the agency pre-
pare the EIS "even though the dam will not be completed for many
years. 213 The Court does not specify the extent to which such an injury214
may deviate from the "'normal standards' for immediacy. 2 5 Regardless,
the hypothetical evinces the Court's willingness to recognize injuries that
may not materialize "for many years" as sufficient to confer standing in
NEPA cases such as Watson. Therefore, the court's determination that
plaintiffs have met the imminence requirement of injury in fact is supported
both by Ninth Circuit cases and Lujan itself.
208 Order Denying MSJ, supra note 25, at 3.
209 See discussion supra Part I.
210 Order Denying MSJ, supra note 25, at 4 (citing Cantrell v. City of Long Beach, 241
F.3d 674, 679 n.4 [sic] (9th Cir. 2001) (citing Lujan, 504 U.S. at 572 n.7)). The order mistak-
enly cites footnote four instead of the correct footnote three.
211 See National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 § 102(2)(C), 42 U.S.C. 4332(2)(C).
212 Order Denying MSJ, supra note 25, at 4 (citing Citizens for Better Forestry v. USDA,
341 F.3d 961, 972 (9th Cir. 2003)).
213 Lujan, 504 U.S. at 572 n.7.
214 In the hypothetical, the injury is the expected future building of the dam and concomi-
tant detriment to the man's property interest.
215 See Sinor, supra note 203, at 880 ("Examination of the hypothetical ... suggests the
immediacy requirement for procedural plaintiffs is virtually eliminated when plaintiffs do not
control the timing of the injury, such as in the case of the dam scenario." (citing Brian J.
Gatchel, Informational and Procedural Standing After Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 11 J.
LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 75, 99 (1995))).
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The court's order notes that an agency's failure to prepare an EIS
216
engenders a risk that it will take environmentally uninformed actions.
This risk is the basis of a plaintiff's injury in fact in a NEPA case, since the
plaintiff is alleging that those actions will effect the specific injuries he
seeks to prevent or ameliorate.21 7 The Supreme Court in Laidlaw held that a
plaintiff who established "reasonable concerns" of injury resulting from
Clean Water Act violations had met the injury in fact requirement. 218 The
Watson court enunciates a similar Ninth Circuit standard, requiring the
Plaintiffs to establish the reasonable probability that such failure will
threaten their concrete interests.
219
Concluding that the Plaintiffs have met this Ninth Circuit injury in
fact standard, the court refers to its obligation "to draw all inferences" in
favor of the Plaintiffs when deciding a motion for summary judgment.22°
But the court need not equivocate in light of the Defendants' failure even to
challenge the Plaintiffs' most cogent argument pertaining to injury in fact.
That is, Defendants do not try to explain how Plaintiffs' numerous current
injuries are deficient in either "concreteness and particularity" or "actuality
and imminence." Friends of the Earth member Dr. Dustan's livelihood as a
marine biologist is compromised by the fact that seventy-five percent of the
coral reefs he once studied are now gone.22' Likewise, Arthur and Anne
Berndt's revenue from maple syrup production is dissipating due to the in-
creased prevalence of dieback in their trees.222 Each of these cases epito-
216 See Order Denying MSJ, supra note 25, at 4.
217 Cf Lujan, 504 U.S. at 572 n.7 ("[U]nder [the Supreme Court's] case law, [a plaintiff]
living adjacent to the site for proposed construction of a federally licensed dam has standing
to challenge the licensing agency's failure to prepare an [EIS], even though he cannot estab-
lish with any certainty that the statement will cause the license to be withheld .... ); id at
573 n.8 ("[A plaintiff] assuredly can [enforce procedural rights], so long as the procedures in
question are designed to protect some threatened concrete interest of his that is the ultimate
basis of his standing.").
218 See Friends of the Earth v. Laidlaw Envtl. Services, 528 U.S. 167, 183-84 ("[T]he
affidavits and testimony presented by [Friends of the Earth] in this case assert that Laidlaw's
discharges [into the river], and the affiant members' reasonable concerns about the effects of
those discharges, directly affected those affiants' recreational, aesthetic, and economic inter-
ests."). The Court accepted Friends of the Earth's proposition that their members' "reason-
able concerns" "would cause [them] to curtail their recreational use of [the river]," and held
that "[tihe proposition is entirely reasonable, the District Court found it was true in this case,
and that is enough for injury in fact." Id. at 184-85.
219 Order Denying MSJ, supra note 25, at 4 (citing Citizens for Better Forestry v. USDA,
341 F.3d 961, 969-70 (9th Cir. 2003)).
220 Id. at 5 (citing Freeman v. Arpaio, 125 F.3d 732, 735 (9th Cir. 1997)). See generally
FED. R. Civ. P. 56(c).
221 Complaint, supra note 160, at 16.
222 Berndt Declaration, supra note 14, at 2-3 ("As a result [of dieback], the crowns of the
trees are not as full or healthy. Smaller, less healthy crowns directly decrease the sap yield
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mizes an injury that "affect[s] the plaintiff in a personal and individual
9922324
way, to quote Lujan on particularity.224 These Plaintiffs' injuries are
actually occurring, so there is no question of imminence. The fact that these
two Plaintiffs surely have demonstrated an injury in fact is important be-
cause the court need only find that one plaintiff has standing in order for the
lawsuit to proceed.225 Therefore, Plaintiffs have inarguably established an
injury in fact. To deny that they have done so would be unreasonable in
general, let alone justifiable for the purpose of deciding a motion for sum-
mary judgment.
B. Causation
Having successfully demonstrated an injury in fact, the Plaintiffs'
next task was to establish a causal connection between that injury and the
Defendants' actions. To make that connection under Lujan, a plaintiff must
show that the injury is "fairly ... trace[able] to the challenged action of the
defendant, and not ... the result [of] the independent action of some third
party not before the court., 226 Noting that the Ninth Circuit had endorsed
the Lujan causation standard,227 the Defendants argued that third parties-
private companies and individual persons-were the ones truly responsible
for producing the greenhouse gas emissions that caused Plaintiffs' injuries.
In support of this proposition, Defendants declared that "most large energy-
related projects" involving either OPIC or Ex-Im would proceed even with-
out the financial support of either agency.228 Therefore, the argument runs,
greenhouse gas emissions linked to these projects would occur independent
of any actions taken by Defendants, so there is no causal connection be-
tween Plaintiffs' injuries and Defendants' actions. However, Defendants'
official public statements belie their claim of playing "limited roles in any
particular project., 229 For example, Ex-Im's 2000 annual report states that
"[b]y targeting financing gaps and officially supported competition, Ex-Im
and sweetness, and therefore negatively affect my revenue stream. I believe this die-back is
caused in part by global warming and is an indication that climate change is beginning to
affect my forest now."). For more on how climate change is affecting the Bemdts' farm, see
discussion supra Introduction.
223 Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 n.1 (1992).
224 For more on "concreteness and particularity" in Lujan, see supra Part II.C.
225 Opposition to MSJ, supra note 28, at 8 (citing Watt v. Energy Action Educ. Found., 454
U.S. 151, 160 (1981)).
226 504 U.S. at 560-61 (citation omitted).
227 MSJ, supra note 27, at 14 (citing Ecological Rights Found. v. Pac. Lumber Co., 230
F.3d 1141, 1152 (9th Cir. 2000)).
228 Id. at 16.
229 Id. at 18.
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Bank supports export sales that otherwise would not have gone forward.2 30
Similarly, OPIC professes to "[e]valuate new projects to ensure that they
would not have gone forward but for OPIC's involvement., 231 The Plaintiffs
further cited reports produced by both Defendants evincing a recognition
that their actions resulted in greenhouse gas emissions.232 Thus, OPIC's and
Ex-Im's pronouncements bolstered Plaintiffs' argument that Defendants
were responsible for producing the greenhouse gas emissions that caused
Plaintiffs' injuries.
The Defendants relied on Florida Audubon Society v. Bentsen and
Foundation on Economic Trends v. Watkins, both discussed in Part II of this
Note, to support the proposition that the "chain of causation" between De-
fendants' actions and Plaintiffs' injuries was too attenuated to meet the
"fairly traceable" standard enunciated in Lujan. In Florida Audubon Soci-
ety,233 the plaintiffs proffered a decidedly elongated chain of causation from
the Treasury Secretary's tax credit to their claimed environmental inju-
ries.234 The court refused to recognize this chain because of two factors: "[1]
the uncertainty of several individual links [in the chain]" and "[2] the num-
ber of speculative links that must hold for the chain to connect the chal-
lenged acts to the asserted particularized injury. 2 35 Considering these fac-
tors, the court held that the plaintiffs had not established that their injuries
were "fairly traceable to the passage of the tax credit., 236 The uncertainty
was high largely because many of the links depended on speculation about
actions of third parties unconnected with the lawsuit.237 Although the De-
fendants did not explain how these factors should be applied to the present
230 Opposition to MSJ, supra note 28, at 24 (citing EXPORT-IMPORT BANK OF THE U.S.,
2000 ANNUAL REPORT 2 (2000) (emphasis added), available at http://www.exim.gov/
about/reports/ar/ar2000/2_misproglance ovrview.pdf).
231 Id. (citing OVERSEAS PRIVATE INVESTMENT CORPORATION, BUDGET REQUEST-FISCAL
YEAR 2005, at 10 (2004) (emphasis added)).
232 Opposition to MSJ, supra note 28, at 25 (citing OVERSEAS PRIVATE INVESTMENT
CORPORATION, CLIMATE CHANGE: ASSESSING OUR ACTIONS 16-20 (2000), http://www.opic.
gov/pdf/publications/climatereport.pdf; EXPORT-IMPORT BANK OF THE U.S., Ex-IM BANK'S
ROLE IN GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS AND CLIMATE CHANGE 29-30 (1999)).
233 Fla. Audubon Soc'y v. Bentsen, 94 F.3d 658 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
234 See id. at 662 ("[Plaintiffs argue] that the tax credit, by increasing the market for ETBE,
would stimulate production of the corn, sugar cane and sugar beets necessary to make the
ethanol from which ETBE is derived, and that this increased crop production would, in turn,
necessarily result in more agricultural cultivation, with its accompanying environmental
dangers, in regions that border wildlife areas [plaintiffs] (or their members) use and enjoy.").
235 Id. at 670 (emphasis added).
236 Id. at 669.
237 Id. at 670. For example, one link in the causal chain depended on the assumption that
third-party farmers would decide to grow more corn and sugar cane, crops used to produce
the tax-credited ETBE, in response to an enlarged market for ETBE. Id.
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case,238 the Plaintiffs sought to distinguish the present case from Florida
Audubon Society.
The Plaintiffs contrasted the "extremely attenuated" chain of causa-
tion in Florida Audubon Society, which comprised several dubious links,
with "the short, logical chain connecting the Defendants' actions to the in-
creased risk to Plaintiffs' interests., 239 First, only a minimal number of steps
is required to trace the production of fossil fuels (by the projects supported
by Defendants) to the combustion of those fossil fuels by third parties
(which causes the injuries suffered by Plaintiffs). Second, each of those
steps is virtually certain to occur; since the projects' purpose is to produce
fossil fuels for consumption, the steps are a logical and necessary means of
achieving that end.2 40 Thus, the Plaintiffs constructed a chain of causation
strong enough to bear Lujan's "fairly traceable" standard.
The court evidently agreed with Plaintiffs that Florida Audubon So-
ciety is inapposite, since the case does not appear in the court's order. In
fact, the court's causation analysis concerns only the question of whether
third parties caused Plaintiffs' injuries. As in its injury in fact analysis, the
court cites footnote seven in Lujan, now to emphasize the "lower threshold
238 Indeed, the Defendants did not mention these factors at all, even as they relate to the
court's opinion in Florida Audubon Society. Instead, Defendants mentioned Florida Audu-
bon Society because it "cit[ed] with approval" Judge D.H. Ginsburg's dissenting opinion on
standing in City of Los Angeles v. National Highway Traffic Safety Administration. MSJ,
supra note 27, at 23. In the same sentence, Defendants claimed that Judge D.H. Ginsburg's
"reasoning reject[ed] alleged impacts of climate change as sufficient to confer Article III
standing." Id. This proposition is plainly specious in light of its use, which is to support
Defendants' argument that any chain of causation involving climate change injury is insuffi-
cient as a matter of law. Florida Audubon Society explicitly overruled the majority's causa-
tion analysis in City of Los Angeles. See supra notes 132-34 and accompanying text. Judge
D.H. Ginsburg's dissenting causation analysis in City of Los Angeles (of which Florida
Audubon Society approved) did lead to a conclusion that climate change impacts were insuf-
ficient to support standing, but of course that conclusion pertained only to the facts of City of
Los Angeles, which Defendants did not discuss in their motion for summary judgment.
239 Opposition to MSJ, supra note 28, at 25 n. 17, 26.
240 Plaintiffs' calculations of Defendants' greenhouse gas emissions include indirect emis-
sions, e.g., the carbon dioxide emitted by an automobile whose fuel was produced by one of
Defendants' projects. See Heede Declaration, supra note 163, at 51. Though Defendants
argued that the court should not consider these indirect emissions because they are not fairly
traceable to Defendants' actions, NEPA explicitly mandates that agencies consider indirect
effects in determining whether their actions are "significant," i.e., whether their actions re-
quire preparation of an EIS. 40 C.F.R. § 1508.25(c) (2006). NEPA defines indirect effects as
effects that "are caused by the [agency] action and are later in time or farther removed in
distance [than direct effects], but are still reasonably foreseeable." 40 C.F.R. § 1508.8(b)
(2006) (emphasis added). Plaintiffs established that Defendants' indirect emissions were
reasonably foreseeable effects of Defendants' actions, since the cause of indirect emissions
(private fossil fuel consumption) is the very purpose those actions. See supra text accompa-
nying this note.
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[showing] for causation in procedural injury cases. ' Accordingly, Defen-
dants' contention that third parties caused Plaintiffs' injuries must be evalu-
ated with respect to this lower threshold (which militates in favor of Plain-
tiffs). 242 In this context, the court references Defendants' pronouncements,
cited by Plaintiffs, indicating that both Ex-Im and OPIC provide crucial
financing for projects that otherwise would not proceed.243 Although Defen-
dants officially disclaimed this crucial role,2" the court believed that their
prior pronouncements commanded more respect, declaring, "Defendants
have not submitted any authority demonstrating.., that [Plaintiffs] have not
met their burden regarding causation., 245 The court's silence on Plaintiffs'
proffered "chain of causation" implicitly acknowledges its validity for the
purpose of standing.
Lujan's "fairly traceable" causation standard, as applied in NEPA
cases and others involving procedural violations, is much less demanding
than the tort causation standard. 46 It only requires a plaintiff to show that
the agency's action has contributed to an increased risk that plaintiff's in-
jury in fact will actually occur.247 Throughout the briefing on Defendants'
motion for summary judgment, Plaintiffs and Defendants persistently dis-
agreed about the proper way to measure Defendants' greenhouse gas emis-
sions.248 Plaintiffs have calculated that Defendants' combined annual green-
house gas emissions equal eight percent of the worldwide total,249 while
241 Order Denying MSJ, supra note 25, at 6. In one respect (that is inconsequential to the
court's ruling on the issue of causation), the Ninth Circuit has interpreted footnote seven
more broadly than the Supreme Court may have intended it to be interpreted. Public Citizen
v. Department of Transportation interpreted footnote seven to endorse standing "even though
there can be no certainty that the company will ever build the dam." Pub. Citizen v. Dep't of
Transp., 316 F.3d 1002, 1018 (9th Cir. 2003) (emphasis added), rev'd on other grounds, 541
U.S. 742 (9th Cir. 2004). See generally supra text accompanying note 213 (describing foot-
note seven's hypothetical scenario). However, footnote seven did not expressly state that
standing could be achieved even if the dam might never be built, only that standing could be
achieved "even though the dam will not be completed for many years." Lujan v. Defenders
of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 572 n.7 (1992). But see supra note 215.
242 Order Denying MSJ, supra note 25, at 6.
243 Id. at 7.
244 Defendants produced declarations in which Ex-Im and OPIC officials stated that "most
large energy-related projects" would proceed without Defendants' financial support. Id.
245 Id.
246 See Opposition to MSJ, supra note 28, at 22-23.
247 See id. at 22 (citing Comm. to Save the Rio Hondo v. Lucero, 102 F.3d 445, 451 (10th
Cir. 1996)).
248 See supra note 240.
249 Heede Declaration, supra note 163 at 12. Richard Heede has published books and re-
ports establishing methodologies to measure the greenhouse gas emissions of countries and
individual companies. See id. at 2-3. Heede currently leads Climate Mitigation Services,
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Defendants' reports250 indicate that the figure is only one percent.2 5 Also,
Defendants contested the two central assertions in Dr. MacCracken's testi-
mony: the connection between greenhouse gas emissions (in general) and
Plaintiffs' injuries,252 and the connection between Defendants' greenhouse
gas emissions and Plaintiffs' injuries.253 These challenges to Plaintiffs' evi-
dence were irrelevant to the disposition of the motion for summary judg-
ment, the court noted.254 Beyond the disposition of the motion, Dr. Mac-
Cracken addresses the magnitude of greenhouse gas emissions that Defen-
dants' already-approved projects will produce during their operational life-
times (the next several decades). This quantity "is a large amount and will
lead to larger changes in the climate and a greater risk that various climatic
thresholds will be exceeded., 255 Specifically, it equals total worldwide
greenhouse gas emissions for two years, or total U.S. greenhouse gas emis-
sions for eight years.256 Thus, Defendants' greenhouse gas emissions in-
crease the likelihood of Plaintiffs' future injuries, as well as exacerbate
Plaintiffs' present injuries.
which he founded in 2002 to provide "emissions inventories" for "non-profit organizations,
municipal governments, professionals, and individuals." Id. at 3.
250 The reports produced by Ex-Im and OPIC in 1999 and 2000, respectively. See supra
note 232.
251 Opposition to MSJ, supra note 28, at 17. Defendants' reports also indicate that Defen-
dants' share of worldwide greenhouse gas emissions will rise to two percent by 2015. Id. at
17-18. Among other differences from the Heede Declaration's methodology, the calculations
in Defendants' reports do not include indirect emissions.
252 See generally Declaration of Dr. David R. Legates, Friends of the Earth v. Watson, No.
C 02-4106 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 29, 2005) [hereinafter Legates Declaration], http://www.climatela
wsuit.org/documents/legatesdeclaration.pdf. Dr. Legates contests the IPCC's finding (see
supra note 32 and accompanying text) that human activity is the main cause of global warm-
ing. See Legates Declaration, supra, at 4-5 ("[lIt is my belief, shared by a large number of
climatologists, that significant questions still remain as to the extent to which this I°F
(0.6'C) rise in air temperature [over the past century] can be attributed to anthropogenic
increases in greenhouse gas concentrations."). Dr. Legates currently holds, or has held, posi-
tions such as "adjunct scholar" and "research fellow" at several institutions that have re-
ceived over $2.5 million in funding from ExxonMobil and Exxon subsidiaries since 1998.
See Exxon Secrets, http://www.exxonsecrets.org (last visited Mar. 4, 2006) (an interactive
site detailing financial connections between "climate change skeptics" and ExxonMobil).
253 For Dr. MacCracken's assertion on the significance of Defendants' greenhouse gas
emissions, see MacCracken Declaration, supra note 39, at 40-44. Defendants contend that
their greenhouse gas emissions are too "minimal" to cause Plaintiffs' injuries. MSJ, supra
note 27, at 19. This contention reflects the parties' disagreement about the proper way to
calculate emissions. See supra note 194 and text accompanying notes 202-05.
254 Order Denying MSJ, supra note 25, at 5 ("[I]n considering a motion for summary
judgment, the court may not weigh the evidence or make credibility determinations .
(citation omitted)).
255 MacCracken Declaration, supra note 39, at 40.
256 Id.
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C. Redressability
To establish redressability, Plaintiffs needed only to show that De-
fendants' financing decisions "could be influenced" by the (court ordered)
preparation and consideration of an EIS." 7 Neither party argued at length on
redressability, since Plaintiffs clearly have met this unimposing standard.
Defendants have not undertaken any environmental review under NEPA
with respect to the projects at issue in this lawsuit,25 8 so mandating consid-
eration of heretofore ignored environmental impacts has at least some
chance of influencing Defendants' financing decisions. The court agreed.259
Footnote seven in Lujan supports this redressability standard, since
it allows a plaintiff to achieve standing "even though he cannot establish
with any certainty that the [EIS] will cause" the agency to make a particular
decision.260 Unlike the present case, "Lujan was not a procedural rights
case." 261 Consequently, footnote seven relates to the present case, while the
Lujan plurality's "constrained" redressability analysis does not. But even if
it did, it would not threaten Plaintiffs' claim on redressability. The Lujan
plurality thought the agencies at issue, who were not parties to the case,
might be free simply to disregard any rule that the Interior Secretary prom-
ulgated in response to a court order.262 Therefore, the court was powerless to
redress plaintiffs' grievances. In Watson, there is no such concern that De-
fendants might not be bound by a court order, since they are (obviously)
parties to the case. Noting that the agencies provided "only a fraction" of
project funding, the Lujan plurality highlighted plaintiffs' dearth of evi-
dence showing that the projects would not proceed without the agencies'
funding.263 In the present case, Plaintiffs have produced that evidence.2 4
Thus, it is "likely, as opposed to merely speculative," that the court has the
power to redress Plaintiffs' injuries.265
257 Opposition to MSJ, supra note 28, at 27 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Citizens for Better
Forestry v. USDA, 341 F.3d 961, 976 (9th Cir. 2003)).
258 Defendants have prepared neither an EA nor an EIS for any project.
259 Order Denying MSJ, supra note 25, at 7.
260 Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 572 n.7 (1992). Presumably, the decision
to withhold a dam's license and the decision to withhold project financing are indistinguish-
able for the purpose of assessing redressability according to footnote seven. Each decision is
the ultimate relief sought by the plaintiff via the EIS.
261 Sinor, supra note 203, at 879. Sinor notes that Lujan "expressly rejected the court of
appeals finding of a procedural injury." Id. at 879 n.203; see also discussion supra Part
II.C.3.
262 See supra text accompanying note 150.
263 See supra text accompanying note 151.
264 See supra text accompanying notes 230-32.
265 Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561 (internal quotations omitted) (citation omitted).
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By attaining Article III standing, the Watson Plaintiffs overcame a
previously insurmountable legal obstacle in climate change litigation. While
the Watson ruling in itself represents a triumph for climate change plaintiffs,
the question remains whether the ruling also represents a broader trend to-
ward standing in climate change lawsuits.
V. BEYOND THE WA TSON RULING
For the environmental organizations, Friends of the Earth and
Greenpeace, the Watson ruling vindicates their argument that the U.S. gov-
ernment should be doing more to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. Now
that a U.S. court has recognized a legal right (standing) to sue for climate
change injuries, surely U.S. citizens have a right to demand that their na-
tional leaders confront the problem, and do not suppress scientific re-
search266 that reveals the magnitude of the problem. The Watson ruling is
also a vindication for the individual Plaintiffs, such as Dr. Dustan and the
Berndts, who have presented a case that is not only legally sufficient for
standing, but compelling. Their injuries-a marine biologist facing fewer
and fewer research opportunities and a married couple resigned to the in-
exorable depreciation of their farm-are depressing to consider, and con-
trast sharply with the "informational injury" alleged in Foundation on Eco-
nomic Trends v. Watkins or the mere damage to recreational areas alleged in
City of Los Angeles v. National Highway Traffic Safety Administration.267
The Watson Plaintiffs have achieved standing, in part, because their injuries
are unique from those alleged in previous climate change lawsuits. The sad
irony is that people across the U.S. are experiencing the same "unique" inju-
ries as the Watson Plaintiffs.
This Part predicts that the Watson Plaintiffs' standing would be up-
held by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, based on the consistency of the
266 See, e.g., Andrew C. Revkin, Climate Expert Says NASA Tried to Silence Him, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 29, 2006, § 1, at 1 (After veteran NASA scientist Dr. James E. Hansen said in a
lecture that the Earth would become "a different planet" without a significant reduction in
greenhouse gas emissions, NASA public affairs officials threatened him with "dire conse-
quences" if he made such statements in the future. One public affairs official refused Na-
tional Public Radio's request for an interview with Dr. Hansen, telling the NPR producer that
his job was "to make the president look good."); Andrew C. Revkin & Katharine Q. Seelye,
Report by E.P.A. Leaves Out Data on Climate Change, N.Y. TIMES, June 19, 2003, at Al
(The White House's Council on Environmental Quality removed from an EPA report a sen-
tence that read, "Climate change has global consequences for human health and the environ-
ment."). See generally Colin Macilwain & Geoff Brumfiel, US Scientists Fight Political
Meddling, 439 NATURE 896, 896 (2006) ("Nobel-prizewinning biologist David Baltimore
used the annual meeting of the American Association for the Advancement of Science
(AAAS) in St Louis to denounce government suppression of scientific findings.").
267 See supra Part II.B.1-2.
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Watson ruling both with Ninth Circuit precedent2 6 and the Supreme Court's
decision in Massachusetts v. EPA.269 This Part also explains why the favor-
able standing rulings in Watson and Massachusetts v. EPA do not necessar-
ily mean that plaintiffs in other climate change cases can achieve standing.
A. The Ninth Circuit Would Affirm Plaintiffs' Standing on Appeal
After prevailing on the standing issue in August of 2005, the Plain-
tiffs filed their own motion for summary judgment in December of 2005.
The Plaintiffs' motion leads with the assertion that "[t]his matter's merits
are straightforward and there is little in actual dispute., 270 OPIC and Ex-Im
are agencies that have taken major federal actions without evaluating the
"reasonably foreseeable ' 27 1 impacts of those actions on global climate
change. Hence, the agencies have refused to comply with NEPA, and their
actions are illegal. The Plaintiffs have requested the court to order the De-
fendants to comply with NEPA.272 In response to the Plaintiffs' motion,
OPIC and Ex-In each filed a cross motion for summary judgment in Janu-
ary of 2006.273 Since Watson is an administrative record case, it will be de-
cided by motion rather than trial.274 In deciding these motions, the court
affords agency action 275 a high degree of deference. Specifically, the court
may order the agencies to comply with NEPA only if it finds that their deci-
sion not to comply with NEPA was "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of dis-
cretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law., 276 Despite this deferential
standard, it is worthwhile to consider what may happen if the court again
rules in favor of the Plaintiffs. If the U.S. District Court for the Northern
District of California grants Plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment, the
Defendants will probably appeal the decision to the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals and renew their challenge to Plaintiffs' standing.277 This Note has
established that the Watson district court's standing ruling rests easily
268 See supra Part IV.
269 Massachusetts v. EPA, No. 05-1120 (U.S. Apr. 2, 2007).
270 Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment at 1, Friends of the Earth v. Watson, No. C
02-4106 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 31, 2006), available at http://www.climatelawsuit.org/2006/Pls.%2
OMot.%20for/o20Summary%20Judgment.pdf.
271 See supra note 240.
272 Complaint, supra note 160, at 47.
273 The Plaintiffs' and Defendants' motions were argued on April 14, 2006.
274 Telephone Interview with Ronald A. Shems, Partner, Shems, Dunkiel, Kassel & Saun-
ders, in Burlington, Vt. (Feb. 1, 2006).
275 In the context of Watson, "agency action" means the Defendants' inaction in failing to
comply with NEPA.
276 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2006).
277 Telephone Interview with Ronald A. Shems, supra note 274.
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within the Ninth Circuit's standing jurisprudence.278 Therefore, the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals would have no basis for finding that Plaintiffs lack
Article III standing and would affirm Plaintiffs' standing.
The Supreme Court's decision in Massachusetts v. EPA bolsters
this prediction. Massachusetts v. EPA arose from a rulemaking petition filed
in 1999 by environmental organizations, which asked the EPA "to regulate
greenhouse gas emissions from new motor vehicles" under the Clean Air
Act.2 79 In 2003 the EPA published an order denying that petition280 and the
petitioners 281 sought review of that order in the District of Columbia Court
of Appeals.282 The petitioners argued that section 202 of the Clean Air Act
compels the EPA to regulate carbon dioxide from new motor vehicles be-
cause carbon dioxide is the principal greenhouse gas and thus "endanger[s]
public health or welfare. 283 In June of 2006 a divided panel of the District
of Columbia Court of Appeals ruled in favor of the EPA on the merits of
case.284 The panel discussed whether the plaintiffs had Article III standing
but did not rule on the issue.285 The Supreme Court reversed the judgment
278 See supra Part IV.
279 See Massachusetts v. EPA, No. 05-1120, slip op. at 6 (U.S. Apr. 2, 2007) (internal quo-
tations omitted) (citation omitted).
280 Id. at 8.
281 The petitioners were twelve states, three cities (New York City, Baltimore and Wash-
ington, D.C.), the territory of American Samoa and several environmental organizations
including Friends of the Earth and Greenpeace. See id. at 1 nn.2-4.
282 Id. at 10.
283 Section 202 of the Clean Air Act provides in part:
The [EPA] Administrator shall by regulation prescribe (and from time to time re-
vise) in accordance with the provisions of this section, standards applicable to the
emission of any air pollutant from any class or classes of new motor vehicles or
new motor vehicle engines, which in his judgment cause, or contribute to, air pol-
lution which may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health or welfare.
42 U.S.C. § 752 1(a)(1) (2006).
284 Massachusetts v. EPA, 415 F.3d 50, 58-59 (D.C. Cir. 2005), rev'd, Massachusetts v.
EPA, No. 05-1120 (U.S. Apr. 2, 2007).
285 See id. at 54-56 (declining to rule on plaintiffs' standing despite noting that courts are
generally required "to resolve Article III standing questions before proceeding to the merits
of a case"). The judges were actually split on the standing issue. Two of the three judges
ruled for the EPA on the merits, and one of those two ruled that the plaintiffs lacked standing
because they had not established injury in fact. Id. at 59 (Sentelle, J., dissenting in part and
concurring in the judgment) (arguing that the plaintiffs had "shown no harm particularized to
themselves" because climate change "is harmful to humanity at large" and plaintiffs are
merely "segments of humanity at large"). However, one judge, Judge Tatel, found that "at
least one" plaintiff had standing and argued that the language of the Clean Air Act compels
the EPA to regulate greenhouse gas emissions from motor vehicles, absent "a reasonable
basis for refusing to do so" which the EPA had not shown. Id. at 62 (Tatel, J., dissenting).
That one plaintiff was Massachusetts, which alleged that it would lose coastal land and sus-
tain damage to coastal property from increased sea levels and storm surge. Id. at 64-65.
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of the District of Columbia Court of Appeals 286 and held that the petitioners
met the Article III standing requirements.287 Though Massachusetts v. EPA
was not a NEPA case like Watson, the Court characterized Massachusetts as
a procedural rights case. The Massachusetts petitioners had a procedural
"right to challenge agency action unlawfully withheld," meaning the EPA's
allegedly unlawful refusal to regulate carbon dioxide from new motor vehi-
cles under the Clean Air Act.288 Because Massachusetts was a procedural
rights case like Watson, the Court applied less-demanding Article III stand-
ing requirements.289 Also, the Court wrote that the State of Massachusetts
was "entitled to special solicitude in [the Court's] standing analysis" be-
cause a State is a quasi-sovereign entity with an interest in preserving "all
the earth and air within its domain., 290 In this case Massachusetts had such
an interest in protecting its sovereign territory from the effects of climate
change.291 However, the Court did not explain specifically how this "special
solicitude" for state plaintiffs affected its Article III standing analysis.
Regarding the Article III standing elements, the Court found that
the State of Massachusetts's injury in fact-loss of coastal land and damage
to coastal property-met the standards of Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife.292
The fact that climate change injuries like coastal land loss are "widely
shared" by citizens and states across the U.S. was inconsequential to the
Court's finding of injury in fact.293 Rising sea levels had already begun to
encroach on Massachusetts's land and this coastal land loss will increase for
the foreseeable future, potentially costing the state hundreds of millions of
dollars.294 In its causation analysis, the Court noted that the U.S. transporta-
Judge Tatel found these injuries sufficiently "particularized." Id. at 65. On the merits of the
case, Judge Tatel rejected the EPA's various justifications for disregarding the statutory
language. Id. at 67-82; see generally id. at 67 ("The [EPA] Administrator shall by regulation
prescribe . . . standards applicable to the emission of any air pollutant from any class or
classes of new motor vehicles or new motor vehicle engines which in his judgment cause, or
contribute to, air pollution which may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health or
welfare." (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(1)) (emphasis added by author)).
286 Massachusetts v. EPA, No. 05-1120, slip op. at 32 (U.S. Apr. 2, 2007).
287 See id. at 23.
288 See id. at 14.
289 See id. ("[A] litigant... vested with a procedural right ... has standing if there is some
possibility that the requested relief will prompt the injury-causing party to reconsider the
decision that allegedly harmed the litigant." (citing Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S.
555, 572 n.7 (1992))).
290 See id. at 15, 17 (quoting Georgia v. Tenn. Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230, 237 (1907)).
291 See id. at 16-17.
292 See id. at 18-20. Even if only one plaintiff meets the Article III standing requirements,
the case proceeds. See id. at 15.
293 See id. at 19.
214 See id. at 19-20.
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tion sector produces over six percent of global carbon dioxide emissions and
that the EPA did not dispute the causal connection between carbon dioxide
emissions and climate change.295 Though EPA's refusal to regulate carbon
dioxide from new motor vehicles implicates only some portion of that six
percent, the size of the portion was unimportant in the Court's causation
analysis.296 Because that six percent constitutes "a meaningful contribution"
to climate change and thus to Massachusetts's injury, the petitioners met the
lowered causation standard for procedural rights cases.297 Regarding re-
dressability, the petitioners asked the Court to require EPA "to apply the
correct legal standard" in deciding whether to regulate carbon dioxide under
the Clean Air Act.298 The ultimate relief sought was to enforce EPA's al-
leged "duty to take steps to slow or reduce" climate change.299 Because this
relief would ameliorate Massachusetts's injury "to some extent," the peti-
tioners established redressability. 00
The foregoing standing analysis in Massachusetts v. EPA affirms
the veracity of the Watson ruling. The injuries alleged in Watson, such as
diminishing professional research opportunities and farm revenue, are oc-
curring now and will continue to occur, i.e., they are both actual and immi-
nent like Massachusetts's injury. Arguably, the injuries in Watson are even
more "particularized" than the loss of coastal land that sufficed in Massa-
chusetts301 since they relate specifically to the livelihoods of the Plaintiffs
and are thus less widely shared. Because Watson is a NEPA case, the court
required the Plaintiffs to establish the "reasonable probability" that OPIC
and Ex-Im's ongoing support of fossil fuel projects without regard for
NEPA would exacerbate the Plaintiffs' current injuries and increase the risk
302
of future injuries. The eight percent of worldwide carbon dioxide emis-
sions produced by OPIC and Ex-Im represented this reasonable probability,
295 See id. at 20-21.
296 See id. at 21-22. The Court rejected EPA's "erroneous assumption that a small incre-
mental step," i.e., EPA's refusal to reduce that six percent by some small portion, "can never
be attacked in a federal judicial forum" because it is incremental. See id. at 21. If that as-
sumption were true, standing would not exist in "most challenges to regulatory action" be-
cause agencies "do not generally resolve massive problems in one fell regulatory swoop."
See id.
297 See id. at 22.
298 See Brief for the Petitioners at 3, Massachusetts v. EPA, No. 05-1120 (U.S. Apr. 2,
2007), available at http://docs.nrdc.org/globalwarming/glo_06083 101 A.pdf.
299 See Massachusetts v. EPA, No. 05-1 120, slip op. at 22 (U.S. Apr. 2, 2007) (emphasis
omitted).
300 See id. at 23.
301 See generally id. at 19-20 (stating that because Massachusetts "owns a substantial por-
tion of the state's coastal property," the loss of coastal land is "a particularized injury in
[Massachusetts's] capacity as a landowner").
302 See supra note 219 and accompanying text.
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which is an element of injury in fact in NEPA cases. In Massachusetts the
Supreme Court addressed the amount of emissions from the U.S. transporta-
tion sector in its causation rather than injury in fact analysis, reflecting the
fact that Massachusetts was not a NEPA case. The Court held that EPA's
failure to regulate carbon dioxide in the U.S. transportation sector-
responsible for six percent of worldwide carbon dioxide emissions-
"contributes" to Massachusetts's injury.30 3 The Court rejected EPA's argu-
ment that this contribution was too insignificant to support standing, noting
that agencies typically solve problems through incremental regulation rather
than drastic panaceas.3°4 Therefore, the relative smallness of the emissions
at issue did not shield the EPA from accountability for the allegedly unlaw-
305ful inaction that produced those emissions. Thus the Court did not require
a particular percentage of carbon dioxide emissions to establish causation.
Though Watson and Massachusetts discussed the defendant's contribution
to climate change in different parts of their respective standing analyses,
both of those discussions essentially answered the question of whether the
defendant's contribution was significant enough to support Article III stand-
ing. In Massachusetts the Supreme Court held that some portion of six per-
cent of global carbon dioxide emissions was significant enough for stand-
ing. A fortiori, the whole eight percent of global carbon dioxide emissions
produced by OPIC and Ex-Im in Watson could support standing. In Watson
the Plaintiffs easily met the last standing element of redressability without
any serious contention 30 6 and nothing in Massachusetts impugns the validity
of the Watson ruling on redressability. Therefore, Supreme Court precedent
as well as Ninth Circuit precedent supports the Watson ruling and the Wat-
son Plaintiffs' standing would be upheld on appeal.
B. Uncertainty Remains for Standing in Future Climate Change Liti-
gation
The standing rulings in Friends of the Earth v. Watson and Massa-
chusetts v. EPA do not necessarily indicate that plaintiffs in other climate
change cases will be able to meet the Article III standing requirements. The
question of whether a plaintiff has standing concerns the particular facts of
the case. As described in Part III of this Note, the facts of Watson distin-
guished it from previous climate change lawsuits filed pursuant to NEPA,
where plaintiffs ultimately did not meet the requirements of Article III
standing. In light of the successes in Watson and Massachusetts, other plain-
tiffs in procedural rights cases should be able to assert injuries that meet
303 See Massachusetts v. EPA, No. 05-1120, slip op. at 20 (U.S. Apr. 2, 2007).
" See id at 20-21.
305 See id. at 21.
306 See supra Part IV.C.
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Lujan's requirement of "actual or imminent" and "concrete and particular-
ized" injury.3 °7 For example, anyone in the U.S. who loses revenue through
depreciation of his farmland caused by climate change experiences an injury
in fact that is practically identical to that of Arthur and Anne Berndt.3 °5
Likewise, many coastal cities and states could claim diminished tourism
revenue resulting from damage to beaches caused by climate change. 309
Establishing causation could be more difficult. The Watson Plaintiffs easily
demonstrated that their injuries were "fairly traceable" to the Defendants
rather than third parties because the Defendants publicly proclaimed their
essential roles in the greenhouse gas-producing projects. 310 Future plaintiffs
have no guarantee that that their chosen defendants will have made such
regrettable statements, and so those defendants might more plausibly claim
that someone else is responsible for the plaintiffs injury. Also, the plaintiff
must show that the defendant's actions produce enough greenhouse gas
emissions to increase the risk that the plaintiffs asserted injury will oc-
cur.311 The Supreme Court in Massachusetts did not indicate precisely how
much is enough for causation, but some government agencies whose actions
produce only small emissions may not "make a meaningful contribution" 312
to climate change. Therefore a plaintiff might not be able to establish causa-
tion in a procedural rights case against such an agency.3 3
307 Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992) (internal quotations omit-
ted).
308 See generally supra Part IV.A (discussing the legal sufficiency of the Berndts' injuries).
309 See generally text accompanying note 173 (describing Santa Monica's injury).
310 See supra text accompanying notes 230-31.
311 See supra notes 246-47 and accompanying text.
312 Massachusetts v. EPA, No. 05-1120, slip op. at 22 (U.S. Apr. 2, 2007).
313 Massachusetts v. EPA does suggest that the climate change plaintiffs in California v.
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration should be able to meet the Article III stand-
ing requirements. California v. Nat'l Highway Traffic Safety Admin., No. 06-72317 (9th Cir.
filed May 3, 2006). There, plaintiff states and cities are challenging NHTSA's proposed
action to raise CAFE standards for model year 2008-2011 light trucks, arguing that the im-
plementation of those standards does not comply with NEPA. See Choo, supra note 158, at
34. NHTSA's decision on CAFE standards will implicate a smaller volume of greenhouse
gas emissions than was involved in Watson. See, e.g., City of Los Angeles v. Nat'l Highway
Traffic Safety Admin., 912 F.2d 478, 484 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (noting that a one mile per gallon
difference in CAFE standards would increase worldwide greenhouse gas emissions by "less
than one percent"), overruled by Fla. Audubon Soc'y v. Bentsen, 94 F.3d 658 (D.C. Cir.
1996). However, the volume of greenhouse gas emissions involved in California will likely
be close to the volume involved in Massachusetts v. EPA, as both cases involve only some
portion of the total amount of emissions produced by the U.S. transportation fleet. Since the
Supreme Court in Massachusetts ruled that this indefinite portion supported a finding of
causation (see supra text accompanying notes 296-99), the Ninth Circuit in California
should rule that the portion produced by NHTSA's allegedly unlawful actions supports the
requisite connection in NEPA jurisprudence between the plaintiffs' injuries and the agency's
action under NEPA. As a coastal State, California can allege virtually identical injuries to
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Outside the realm of procedural violations, the precedential value of
Watson and Massachusetts to climate change plaintiffs is even less predict-
able. Climate change plaintiffs in tort cases could establish injury in fact just
as surely as the climate change plaintiffs in Watson and Massachusetts be-
cause injury in fact standards, unlike causation and redressability standards,
are not diminished in procedural rights cases.3 14 But a plaintiff in a public
nuisance lawsuit against energy companies whose power plants produce
large amounts of greenhouse gases 315 would face a more robust Article III
standing test than the plaintiffs faced in the procedural cases of Watson and
Massachusetts. Lujan's normal causation and redressability standards316
would apply. Therefore, the Watson and Massachusetts standing decisions
would not pertain to such a case.
CONCLUSION
OPIC and Ex-Im want no part of environmental impact statements,
or for that matter anything NEPA-related; and for good reason. Complying
with NEPA would entail a substantial amount of work for both agencies and
produce publicly available documents that detail their contributions to
global climate change. For example, Ex-Im would first prepare an EA to
determine whether its financing of overseas fossil fuel and energy projects
"significantly affects the quality of the human environment." If the EA led
Ex-Im to answer that question affirmatively, Ex-Im might have to prepare
the "programmatic" EIS that Plaintiffs have requested the court to order.
This programmatic EIS would catalog Ex-Im's past, present, and foresee-
able future financing decisions and evaluate the environmental effects of the
those of Massachusetts in Massachusetts v. EPA and thereby establish injury in fact. See
generally Massachusetts v. EPA, No. 05-1120, slip op. at 18-20 (U.S. Apr. 2, 2007) (de-
scribing Massachusetts's injuries). And as a State generally, California should be entitled to
the same "special solicitude" in the Ninth Circuit's standing analysis as the Supreme Court
afforded the State of Massachusetts in Massachusetts v. EPA (whatever the practical implica-
tions of that special solicitude). See supra notes 290-91 and accompanying text. As in Wat-
son, the California plaintiffs' request that NHTSA comply with NEPA in implementing
CAFE standards should establish redressability. Therefore, the California plaintiffs should
have Article III standing.
314 See Order Denying MSJ, supra note 25, at 5-6 ("In cases asserting a procedural chal-
lenge, once a plaintiff establishes an injury in fact, the causation and redressability standards
are relaxed." (citing Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 572 n.7 (1992))).
315 Several states, New York City, and other organizations filed such a lawsuit in 2004.
Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., 406 F. Supp. 2d 265 (S.D.N.Y. 2005). The court dis-
missed the suit in 2005 on the grounds that it presented "non-justiciable political questions,"
see id. at 274, and thus did not address whether the plaintiffs had Article III standing. The
plaintiffs have appealed that dismissal to the Second Circuit Court of Appeals. See Choo,
supra note 158, at 34. See generally Grossman, supra note 159, at 52-59 (arguing that public
nuisance law provides the best foundation for a tort-based climate change lawsuit).
316 See supra text accompanying note 140.
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greenhouse gases emitted as a result of those decisions. Ex-Im would be
required to evaluate those effects with respect for scientific integrity,3 17 and
to consider less environmentally harmful alternatives to their decisions.
Considering the above, if the Watson court grants the Plaintiffs' motion for
summary judgment, the Defendants almost certainly will appeal that deci-
sion to the Ninth Circuit, and the Watson Plaintiffs' standing to sue will
again be at issue.
This Note has explained why the U.S. District Court for the North-
ern District of California got it right: the Watson climate change Plaintiffs
have standing to sue. The Watson Plaintiffs' injuries and are both "concrete
and particularized" and "actual or imminent." Their injuries are "fairly
traceable" to Defendants' greenhouse gas emissions, as Plaintiffs' expert
scientific testimony has shown that those emissions exacerbate Plaintiffs'
current injuries, while making their anticipated injuries more likely to occur.
Finally, those injuries can be redressed by a decision compelling OPIC and
Ex-Im to follow NEPA, the law passed by Congress precisely for the pur-
pose of preventing what the Defendants are now doing: making environ-
mentally uninformed decisions at the expense of U.S. citizens.
Whether the Watson Plaintiffs will ultimately prevail on the merits
is a question beyond the scope of this Note. What this Note has established,
however, is that Arthur and Anne Berndt at least have a case. That only
seems just, considering what they have lost.
317 40 C.F.R. § 1502.24 (2006). The effect of this requirement is that Dr. Legates, Defen-
dants' climate change expert, would not be allowed to help prepare the EIS. See supra note
252.
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